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ABSTRACT
We examine how product differentiation influences mergers and acquisitions and the ability of firms
to exploit product market synergies.  Using novel text-based analysis of firm 10K product descriptions,
we find three key results.  (1) Firms are more likely to enter restructuring transactions when the language
describing their assets is similar to all other firms, consistent with their assets being more redeployable.
(2) Targets earn lower announcement returns when similar alternative target firms exist.  (3) Acquiring
firms in competitive product markets experience increased profitability, higher sales growth, and increased
changes in their product descriptions when they buy target firms that are similar to them and different
from rival firms.  Our findings are consistent with similar merging firms exploiting synergies to create
new products and increase their product differentiation relative to ex-ante rivals.
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Gordon.Phillips@marshall.usc.eduIt has long been viewed that product market synergies and competition are key
drivers of mergers.1 One important dimension of synergies is the ability of merging
rms to create new products and dierentiate themselves from rivals when merging
rms have complementary assets. This dimension of synergies is frequently cited as
being important for mergers but has not been documented as being an important
factor for mergers.2 We examine whether product market measures of similarity and
competition aect rms' propensity to merge and whether rms use mergers and
acquisitions to increase prots and introduce new products given asset complemen-
tarities.3
In competitive markets, mergers are a quick way to potentially increase product
oerings if synergies arise from asset complementarities. Thus, rms may have in-
centives to merge with rms that have dierent skills or technologies that increase
the ability to introduce new products. Another important concern to acquirers is to
introduce new products that dierentiate them from existing rival rms. There is
thus a potential tension between merging with a rm whose products are very sim-
ilar, and a rm whose skills or technologies are dierent enough from rivals to help
dierentiate the acquirer.
We explore this \similar but dierent" tension in examining the likelihood of
mergers and ex post merger outcomes. Our paper provides direct evidence on asset
complementarities and synergies as a source of gains from merging. We provide
evidence on how similar rms are with respect to their existing products and also
measure new product creation and the extent that product dierentiation from rival
rms increases post merger.
1See Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord (2001) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2007) for two
surveys on dierent motives for mergers.
2Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) model asset complementarity and synergies as a motive for
mergers and provide evidence that merging rms have similar market-to-book valuations. However,
given they do not have product data or descriptions, they are unable to provide direct evidence
that rms with asset complementarities combine to exploit potential synergies. Healy, Palepu, and
Ruback (1992) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord (2001) have documented increased industry-
adjusted cash ows following mergers. However, the literature has not been able to identify if asset
complementarities allowing rms to introduce new products are responsible for gains in cash ows.
3Chamberlain (1933) and Hotelling (1929) famously show that the notion of product dierentia-
tion is fundamental to theories of industrial organization, with product dierentiation increasing the
protability of rms. The Hotelling model allows for a concept of distance and makes a distinction
between \close" rivals versus \distant" rivals, a concept that we exploit. In Chamberlain, product
dierentiation exists but all rivals are equally close. See also the survey by Eaton and Lipsey (1989).We employ a novel empirical design using text-based analysis of rm product de-
scriptions obtained from web-crawling algorithms that read and process 49,408 10-K
lings from the SEC Edgar website. From rm product descriptions we calculate
measures of product similarity and product market competition. Our product based
measures capture the degree to which products are dierent from rivals - while inde-
pendently measuring the similarity between the acquirer and target. Our framework
also permits analysis of product descriptions in time series, and we can thus analyze
likely synergies in the form of new product introductions.
We test how competition and product similarity aect the likelihood of mergers
and acquisitions, the size of stock-market gains, and which transactions are most suc-
cessful in the long-run. Our similarity measures allow us to directly address the dual
role of competition and relatedness in merger decisions and outcomes, and permit us
to test whether new product synergies are closely tied to the positive real outcomes
we report. Our hypotheses relating ex post outcomes of mergers to product mar-
ket competition and product similarity cannot be tested using similarity measures
based on traditional SIC codes, given that they are too granular and do not capture
similarity both within and across industries.
We report three major ndings. First, we nd that the distribution of rivals around
a given rm strongly predicts the likelihood that it will merge. Second, transactions
in competitive product markets with similar acquirer and target rms experience
increased stock returns and real longer-term gains including higher protability and
increased changes in their product descriptions. Third, these ndings are especially
strong when the target is less similar to the acquirer's closest rivals. These results
are robust to the inclusion of measures of horizontal and vertical relatedness using
SIC codes and the product input-output matrix. We now summarize each of these
ndings in more detail.
Regarding transaction likelihood, we nd that rms having products that are more
broadly similar to all other rms in the economy are more likely to restructure, and
rms having more very close rivals are less likely to restructure. We interpret the rst
eect as an \asset deployability eect", as rms with more broadly similar products
likely have assets that can be more easily deployed in other product markets, and
2hence face a larger opportunity set of possible transactions. We interpret the second
eect as a \competitive eect", as rms with very near rivals must compete for any
available restructuring opportunities. These eects are signicant, economically and
statistically, and for large and small rms alike.
We also nd that mergers and acquisition transactions experience higher mar-
ket reactions and positive long-term real outcomes (higher protability and evidence
of new product introductions) when acquirers reside in ex-ante competitive product
markets, and when the transaction increases the acquirer's product market dierenti-
ation relative to its close rivals. These ndings are both statistically and economically
signicant. Our results suggest that product market competition can be inuenced
by merging. In particular, rms residing in ex-ante competitive industries can use
restructuring to reduce competition. We also nd that gains from this strategy are
larger when the target and the acquirer are more pairwise similar, consistent with
mergers involving rms with related products experiencing signicant gains. Gains
are also larger when there is evidence of barriers to entry, suggesting that rivals will
not be able to replicate the new products.
We dier from the existing literature in three major ways. First, the literature
has not focused on how product dierentiation and competition aect the probability
of restructuring and subsequent ex-post performance and product development. Sec-
ond, we present an innovative new methodology based on text analysis that allows
us to separately measure an acquirer's similarity to its rivals, the location of the tar-
get relative to the acquirer's rivals, and the target and acquirer pairwise similarity.
Existing studies have relied on SIC code based variables to measure product mar-
ket competitiveness and rm similarity. Most recently, Fan and Goyal (2006) show
that mergers that are vertically related using the input-output matrix have positive
announcement wealth eects in the stock market. While partially informative, SIC
code based measures cannot measure the degree to which rms are similar within
and across industries. Our continuous measure of similarity is important economi-
cally and statistically even after controlling for both horizontal and vertical measures
of relatedness using SIC codes. We document that the product similarity of merger
pairs is highly diverse both within and across industries. Our measure also captures
3how close merging rms are to existing rival rms. Our results show that our mea-
sure of similarity and competition signicantly helps explain ex post changes in cash
ows, sales, and new product introduction. Lastly, we also measure barriers to entry
by examining the frequency of the word root \patent".
Our research contributes to existing strands of literature using text analysis in
nance. Hanley and Hoberg (2008) examine prospectus disclosures on the SEC Edgar
website and construct section size measures and document similarity measures to
address theories of IPO pricing. Outside of corporate nance, other studies that use
text based analysis to study the role of the media in stock price formation include
Tetlock (2008), Macskassy, Saar-Tsechansky, and Tetlock (2004), Li (2006a), and
Boukus and Rosenberg (2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion of merger strate-
gies and the incentives to merge is in section I. The data, methodology and summary
statistics are presented in section II. Section III introduces our new empirical mea-
sures of product market similarity, and Section IV examines key predictions regarding
their relationship to rm protability. Determinants of the likelihood of restructur-
ing transactions are presented in section V. A discussion of ex-post outcomes upon
announcement and in the long term is in section VI. Section VII concludes.
I Incentives to Merge and Post-Merger Performance
This section rst discusses existing literature on mergers and, second, develops our
hypotheses of how potential changes to product dierentiation and competition may
aect a rm's decision to merge and its post-merger performance.
A Relation to Previous Literature on Mergers
Our paper focuses on how high ex ante product market competition creates incentives
to merge, and how mergers may create prots through synergies and subsequent
product dierentiation. The central idea is that rms may wish to merge with partners
with complementary assets who expand their range of products through new product
4introductions (enabling them to dierentiate their products from rival rms) - while
also picking partners that are related enough so that they can skillfully manage the
new assets.
This rationale for mergers is distinct from the existing motives in the nance lit-
erature.4 Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) also consider synergies through asset
complementarities as a motive for mergers - but do not consider how competition im-
pacts this motive, nor do they empirically measure ex post new product introduction.
We also use text based methods to directly measure asset complementarity of merger
partners rather than inferring it using market-to-book ratios. Overall, the existing
literature does not consider how product market competition aects the incentives to
choose targets that can increase product market dierentiation from close rivals as
in Hotelling (1929). Perhaps more importantly, using new techniques, our paper can
measure potential synergies through asset complementarities and how similar merg-
ing rms are from rivals and also document ex post changes in product dierentiation
post merger.
In addition to increases in product dierentiation, key to understanding ex post
performance after mergers are measures of relatedness of the target and acquirer.
As emphasized by many authors, related acquisitions have the potential to perform
better as the acquirer is likely to have existing skill in operating the target rm's
assets. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) show that related mergers are less likely to be
divested subsequently by the acquirer - although they do not nd any dierence in
the performance of diversifying versus non-diversifying mergers. Maksimovic, Phillips,
and Prabhala (2008) nd that acquirers with more skill in particular industries are
more likely to maintain and increase the productivity of the assets they acquire and
keep in related industries. Fan and Goyal (2006) show that mergers that are vertically
related using the input-output matrix have positive announcement wealth eects in
the stock market. While partially informative, SIC code based measures cannot
4Existing reasons for mergers include technological industry shocks and excess industry capacity
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Jensen (1993), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and
Staord (2004), Harford (2005)), reduction of agency problems (Jensen (1993)), agency and empire
building (Hart and Moore (1995)), demand shocks and eciency (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001),
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), Yang (2008)) and the industry life cycle (Maksimovic and Phillips
(2008)).
5measure the degree to which rms are similar within and across industries. Our
study shows that many merging rms are highly related using text-based measures
even though they have dierent two-digit SIC codes that are not related. Most
importantly, discrete measures of relatedness cannot capture how related rivals are
to the merging rms both within and across industries.
Research in industrial organization has also studied mergers in industries with
existing dierentiated products. Baker and Bresnahan (1985) theoretically model how
mergers can increase pricing power by enabling post-merger rms to increase prices.
The prescribed policy is to merge with rms whose products are close substitutes
to yours, when other non-merging rms only produce distant substitutes. Pricing
power is enhanced by merging because post-merger rms face an increased steepness
in their residual (inverse) demand curves. Empirical studies in this literature have
focused on estimating own and cross-price elasticities of demand, as well as the eect
on post-merger prices in specic markets including the ready-to-eat cereal market
(Nevo (2000)).
Our study has a dierent focus. Instead of taking the extent of product dier-
entiation as given, we examine how producers in competitive markets with similar
products may be able to use mergers to increase their dierentiation relative to rival
rms by using synergies to enhance and develop new products. The exibility of our
text based measures, especially our ability to measure product similarity across arbi-
trary groups of rms and in time series, allows us to test for evidence of new product
introductions.
B Product Dierentiation and Changing Competition
A simple example illustrates how managers can reduce competition via mergers when
they reside in ex-ante competitive product markets, and illustrates why a rened no-
tion of product dierentiation and competition is important. First consider a manager
producing product X in a competitive industry with 100 homogeneous rms. Here,
mergers oer little help in reducing competition because an oligopoly of 99 is little
dierent than an oligopoly of 100 rms. However, consider the situation if the 100
6rms are somewhat dierentiated, with some rms having complementary assets. We
assume that rms with complementary assets can merge and the two rms can jointly
produce a new product Z at a lower expected cost (equivalently a higher probability
of success).5 Gains from a merger are possible if product Z is somewhat dierent
from existing products such that the new combined rm faces less competition and
enjoys higher prot margins. Hence, rms can use mergers to substantially alter the
degree of competition they face when they reside in dierentiated product markets.
Only an empirical design capable of measuring the degree of product similarity both
within and across industries can test these theories.
C Hypotheses
We now develop specic hypotheses based on the aforementioned theories of merger
pair similarity and industrial organization. Our rst two hypotheses concern the
probability that a given rm will become part of an acquisition. Our last three
hypotheses formulate predictions regarding ex post outcomes.
Hypothesis H1: Asset Redeployability: Firms with assets that are similar
to large numbers of rms are more likely to enter into restructuring transactions.
Hypothesis H2: Competition for Targets: Firms with high local product
market competition are less likely to be targets and enter restructuring transactions
given the existence of multiple substitute target rms. This competition not only
reduces the likelihood that any given rm will merge, but will also reduce the premium
realized by a target when it does merge.
Key to testing H1 and H2 is the degree of similarity. The eects of H2 are likely
to be more severe when rms are very similar. For example, identical rms would
have to compete in order to merge with a third rm oering new synergies requiring
their technology. In contrast, the eects of H1 are more likely to hold when rms
are moderately similar, as such rms are less viable substitutes. Also, some degree of
heterogeneity is likely required in order for new product synergies to be possible.
5It is also necessary that contracting costs and ex post holdup prevent a contract from being
signed between the rms.
7Our remaining hypotheses focus on long term outcomes.
Hypothesis H3: Dierentiation from Rivals: Acquirers in competitive
product markets experience positive outcomes when they buy target rms that help
them to increase product dierentiation relative to their nearest ex-ante rivals.
Hypothesis 3 follows from two ideas. First, basic industrial organization (as in
Hotelling (1929)) suggests that rms that dierentiate themselves and generate local
product monopolies should be more protable. Second, prots from this strategy
can be leveraged through new product introductions, especially when synergies allow
products in markets with lower competition from rivals.
Hypothesis H4: Synergies through Asset Complementarities: Acquirers
buying targets similar to themselves are likely to have asset complementarities and
experience future higher protability and product dierentiation.
The reasons why acquirer and target pairwise similarity should result in positive
outcomes as in Hypothesis 4, are numerous as discussed earlier in section I. Our
primary rationale is that products developed using technology from similar targets
with complementary (similar) assets are more likely to succeed as in Rhodes-Kropf
and Robinson (2008).
The merger strategies underlying Hypotheses 3 and 4 might be especially relevant
in competitive product markets because the gains from product dierentiation are
likely to be at a maximum when competition is reduced (Hypothesis 3), and highly
similar targets are more likely to exist (Hypothesis 4). Although they might seem
at odds, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Key to maximizing gains is
nding a target that is both somewhat distant from the acquirer's closest rivals, yet
not too distant from the acquirer itself - "similar to self and dierent than rivals".
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
We illustrate these hypotheses using two examples: the Symantec and Veritas (SV)
merger, and the Disney and Pixar (DP) merger. We base our discussion on actual
similarity data (described fully in Section II). Figure 1 displays the SV merger, and
the ten nearest rival rms surrounding both Symantec and Veritas. Firms with a label
8\S" are among Symantec's closest rivals and rms with a \V" are among Veritas's
closest rivals. Both rms oer products that are indeed related to each other (Veritas
is Symantec's 18th closest rm and Symantec is Veritas's 37th closest), but also quite
dierent. Symantec focuses on anti-virus software and Veritas focuses on internet
security and authentication. The gure shows that Symantec faced a fair amount
of competition from its rivals including Cyberguard, McAfee, and Watchguard, for
example.
The SV merger is consistent with Symantec choosing Veritas because it is sim-
ilar enough to permit successful managerial integration and new product synergies
(Hypothesis 4), perhaps in the form of new security products defending joint PC and
internet applications. This merger also might help Symantec to dierentiate itself
from its rivals and introduce new products that will face little in the way of ini-
tial competition (Hypothesis 3), which in turn will improve prot margins. Hence,
Symantec might use the merger to change the degree of product market competition
it faces, a strategy that might be especially eective if Veritas owns key patents or
trade secrets preventing rivals from launching similar products (Hypothesis 5, see
below). Importantly, this notion of similar but dierent is underscored by comparing
the chosen target to a hypothetical merger between Symantec and one of its other
near rivals such as McAfee. Because the products oered by the rms in this hypo-
thetical pair are closer to being perfect substitutes, both in terms of technology and
end consumer usage, gains from Hypotheses 3 and 5 are likely not possible, explaining
why Veritas might be a more appropriate target.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
The DP merger in Figure 2 shows by example that the same logic applies to larger
rms with many products. Disney is Pixar's sixth closest rival, and Pixar is Disney's
ninth closest rival. Only one other rm, Newscorp, is a member of both rms' near-
est ten rivals. Pixar's nearest two rivals are Dreamworks and IMAX, consistent with
Pixar's focus on computer generated motion pictures. Disney is ranked ninth on
Pixar's list likely because it oers many products including television programming
and amusements that are related to, but not exactly substitutes for motion pictures.
9Disney's nearest two rivals are Newscorp and and CBS, and Six Flags is its fourth
closest rival, suggesting that Disney has a signicant television and print media pres-
ence, as well as an amusement park presence. Pixar's appeal to Disney might be due
to both its asset similarity, but also its moderately dierent product oerings, as this
merger might permit seamless integration and new product introductions that can
enhance pricing power in niche markets.
If Disney were to merge with its closest rival, it would choose to merge with
NewsCorp, or perhaps with one of the other top ranked rms. This transaction
would score highly on pairwise product similarity (Hypothesis 4), but it might not
be dierent enough from existing rivals to enable the introduction of new products in
less competitive product markets (Hypothesis 3). In contrast, Pixar has the benet
of still being pairwise similar to Disney (its ninth closest rm), but it also has the
virtue of being distant from Disney's other close rivals. This point is underscored by
the fact that only one rm other than Disney and Pixar themselves are in both rms'
nearest ten. Hence, Pixar scores highly on both dimensions and is both similar to the
acquirer (Hypothesis 4) and distant from Disney's other closest rivals (Hypothesis 3).
This right mix of "similar to self but dierent than rivals" should increase product
dierentiation and protability for Disney.
It is also relevant to consider the reaction of Disney's rivals to mergers tting
this prole. The hypothesized gains might be transient, for example, if the target's
assets and product lines are not protected by high replication costs or patents. Rival
rms could develop similar products and erase any pricing power generated by the
transaction. Our next hypothesis is based on this intuition.
Hypothesis H5: Barriers to Entry: Gains from restructuring will be even
larger if barriers to entry such as patents exist, as rivals would be less able to replicate
the acquirer's strategy.
10II Data and Methodology
A Data Description
The key innovation of our study is that we use rms' 10-K text product descriptions
to compute continuous measures of product similarity for every pair of rms in our
sample (a pairwise similarity matrix). We construct these text-based measures of
product similarity (described later in this section) using rm product descriptions
that we obtain directly from 10-K lings on the SEC Edgar website during the period
electronic 10K records are available. We merge these product similarity measures to
the COMPUSTAT/CRSP database using the tax identication number (also known
as the employee identication number), and we then link this rm-level database to
the SDC Platinum database of mergers and acquisition of asset transactions. In order
to be in our rm-level database, for both rms involved in mergers and acquisitions
and all other rms, a rm must exist in both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases
in the given year of analysis. 52,013 rm years pass this initial screen.
We electronically gather 10-Ks by searching the Edgar database for lings that ap-
pear as \10-K", \10-K405", \10KSB", \10KSB40". Prior to 1997, the Edgar database
is somewhat sparse as electronic ling was not required until 1997. Of the 52,013 rm
years that are present in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT, we are are able to match
and read 49,408 lings (95%) associated with scal years ending in 1997 to 2005. Note
we do not include 10-K lings from investment trusts, tracking stocks, and inactive
rms.6 These 49,408 lings match with the COMPUSTAT database based on their
tax ID number, and most match directly without any intervention. However, a small
number of rms (roughly 1% to 2% of our sample) experienced changes in their tax
ID number during our sample period, and we hand correct links for these rms.7
6Although we consider scal year endings through 2005, we extract documents led through
December 2006, as most of the lings in 2006 are associated with scal years ending in 2005. Hence,
our main database ends in 2005, as we consider the scal year end to be the unit of observation, as
is the case in the standard COMPUSTAT database. Regarding the start date of our main database,
we use observations associated with 1996 scal year endings only for the purposes of computing
lagged variables, and hence our main database begins in 1997. To ensure maximum coverage, we
search for lings beginning in January 1996 as some rms with scal years ending in the earlier part
of 1996 le their 10-K in calendar year 1996.
7The COMPUSTAT tax ID number is only available as a header variable and this variable thus
reects the rm's most recent tax ID number. Because some rms maintain the same COMPUSTAT
11We extract the product description section from each linked 10-K. This section
appears as Item 1 or Item 1A in most 10-Ks. We utilize a combination of PERL
web crawling scripts, APL programming, and human intervention (when documents
are non-standard) to extract and summarize this section. The web crawling algo-
rithm scans the Edgar website and collects the entire text of each 10-K annual re-
port, and APL text reading algorithms then extract its product description and tax
number. This latter process is extensively supported by human intervention when
non-standard document formats are encountered. This method is highly reliable and
we encountered only a very small number of rms (roughly 100) that we were not
able to process because they did not contain a valid product description or because
the product description had fewer then 1000 characters. These rms are excluded
from our analysis.
Our database of 49,408 lings in our sample years of 1997 to 2005, and 6485
additional observations for scal years ending in 1996 (these latter observations are
used solely for computing the values of lagged variables) represents 95.0% of the
eligible CRSP and COMPUSTAT database. We can also report that our database is
well balanced over time, as we capture 95.6% of the eligible data in 1997, and 94.3% in
2005, and this annual percentage varies only slightly in the range of 93.6% in 2000 to
95.9% in 2003. Because we do not observe any time trends in our data coverage, and
because database selection can be determined using ex-ante information (ie, the 10-K
itself), we do not believe these requirements induce any bias. Our nal sample size
is 47,394 rather than 49,408 because we additionally require that key COMPUSTAT
data items, (sales, assets and operating cash ow), are populated before observations
can be included in our analysis.
gvkey and CRSP permno even as their Tax ID number changes, these hand corrections ensure that
our database has uniform coverage over all of our sample years. These hand corrections are mainly
based on comparing the rm names at the time of ling to those listed in the CRSP historical names
database. Although fuzzy matching is used to suggest possible corrections, all nal corrections are
hand veried.
12B Product Similarity
For each rm i and j, we measure product similarity using a method based on each
rm's empirical distribution of words used in its product description. This method
results in a real number in the interval (0,1) to capture the similarity of words used for
each pair of rms. Details are discussed in Appendix 1. The main idea is that rms
having more common word usage are scored as having a higher degree of product
similarity. The method uses a normalization to avoid over-scoring larger documents,
and a simple adjustment to exclude very common words. Based on these pairwise
similarities, we compute the following measures local and broad similarity. We also
compute a measure of barriers to entry based on usage of the word root \patent".
Product Similarity (All Firms - 10): For a given rm i, this variable is the average
pairwise similarity between rm i and all other rms j in the sample - excluding
i's 10 closest rivals.
Product Similarity (10 Nearest): For a given rm i, this variable is the average
pairwise similarity between rm i and its ten closest rivals j. The closest rivals
are the ten rms having the highest similarity relative to i.
% Neighbor Patent Words: For each rm, we rst compute the percentage of all of
the words in its product description having the word root \patent". Because
our focus is on whether a product market is protected by barriers to entry
(hypothesis H5), we then compute this variable's average over each rm's ten
nearest rivals.
Last Year 10 Nearest Fraction Restructured: For rm i, this variable is equal to the
fraction of its ten closest rivals that were either a target or an acquirer in the
previous year according to the SDC Platinum database.
Target + Acquirer Product Similarity: For a given merger pair (target and acquirer),
this is the product similarity of the two rms.
Gain in Product Dierentiation: This variable is the target's average distance from
the acquirer's 10 nearest rivals minus the acquirer's average distance from its 10
nearest rivals. Pairwise distance is one minus pairwise similarity. This variable
measures the degree to which an acquirer gains product dierentiation from its
rivals by purchasing the given target.
Product similarities are most intuitive when rms have only one segment. Impor-
tantly, our computer-based algorithms are not able to separate the text associated
with each segment of conglomerate rms.8 However, we believe that similarities mea-
sured relative to conglomerates are still informative regarding the competition faced
8Multiple segments appear in product descriptions, but automated text reading algorithms cannot
separate the text attributable to each due to the high degree of heterogeneity in how segment
descriptions are organized.
13by the rm in all of its segments. To the extent that multiple segments might add
noise to our measures, we do not see this as a problem as it would only bias our
results away from nding signicant results. However, to ensure our inferences do
not change, we also rerun all of our tests using the subsample of single segment rms.
Although not reported to conserve space, our results change little in this subsample.9
C Other Control Variables
Past studies seeking to measure product dierentiation have been forced to rely on
industry denitions based on SIC codes. We thus control for the following standard
measures of industry competition and merger similarity based on SIC codes.
Sales HHI (SIC-3): We use the two step method described in Hoberg and Phillips
(2008) to compute sales-based Herndahl ratios for each three-digit SIC code.
This method uses data based on both public and private rms to compute
the best estimate of industry concentration given the limited data available on
private rm sales.
Last Year SIC-3 % Restructured: For a given rm i, we compute the percentage of
rms in its three-digit SIC code that were involved in restructuring transactions
in the previous year according to the SDC Platinum database.
Same SIC-3 Industry Dummy: For a given merger pair, this is variable is one if the
two rms are in the same three-digit SIC code.
Vertical Similarity Dummy: For a given merger pair, this is variable is one if the
two rms are at least 5% vertically related. We use the methodology described
in Fan and Goyal (2006) to construct this variable. In particular, based on four
digit SIC codes of both the target and the acquirer, we use the Use Table of
Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the US Economy to compute the fraction
of the inputs that are from the other rm's SIC industry. If this percentage
exceeds 5% for either rm, then the dummy is set to one. For robustness
we also replace this dummy variable with the percentage shipped from merger
partner's industry i to merging partner's industry j.
Although Herndahl indices based on SIC codes are informative in many applica-
tions, we present evidence that SIC codes provide only a weak measure of competition.
This is primarily due to their granularity. We include both SIC code based measures
and text-based measures of similarity throughout our analysis, and we document the
benets of each. We also include controls for the following variables at the transaction
level.
9In some isolated cases, signicance levels decline from the 1% level to the 5% or 10% level due
to reduced power.
14Target Relative Size: The pre-announcement market value of the target divided by
the sum of the pre-announcement market values of the target and the acquirer.
Merger Dummy: A dummy variable equal to one if the given transaction is a merger
and zero if it is an acquisition of assets. We only examine these two transaction
types.
Merger x Relative Size: The cross product of the above two variables.
Log Total Size: The natural logarithm of the sum of the pre-announcement market
values of the target and the acquirer.
III Mergers and Product Market Similarity
We begin by exploring how mergers relate to our product market similarity measure.
To show their uniqueness relative to SIC codes, Table I lists all restructuring pairs
in 2005 that are very similar (the top percentile of similarity from all rm pairings)
despite the fact that they reside in dierent two-digit SIC codes. The list suggests
that the high degrees of similarity are, in fact, due to real product similarities. For
example, petroleum and pipeline rms are related. Newspapers and radio are also
related, and can be viewed as substitute sources of advertising despite their being in
dierent two-digit SIC codes.
To further illustrate how the algorithm rated these rms, Table II displays the
full list of words that were common for the rst ten of these related transactions.
Appendix 2 presents the word lists for the remaining transactions in Table I. Table II
further illustrates the limitations of using SIC codes as an all or nothing classication
of merger pair similarity. The word lists suggest that the similarity calculations are
indeed driven by product market content, consistent with our interpretation of the
similarity measures as representing product market similarity. Key to this result is
our focus on non-common words, as our similarity calculations are based only on
words that appear in no more than 5% of all 10-Ks in the given year. This eliminates
templates, legal jargon and other non-product related content. The list of similar
words for each pair is also substantial, indicating that our basis for dening similarity
is informative.
Table III displays summary statistics for our key variables based on our rm
and transaction level databases. 15.1% of the rms in our rm-level database were
15targets either of a merger or an acquisition of assets, and 28.2% were acquirers.
These numbers are somewhat larger than some existing studies because (1) our sample
includes more recent years in which transactions were more common, (2) these gures
include both mergers and partial acquisitions, and (3) transactions are included if the
counterparty is public or private. We next report the fraction of targets and acquirers
by transaction type, and nd that mergers (4.3% targets and 10.4% acquirers) are
less common than asset acquisitions (10.8% targets and 17.7% acquirers). However,
both transaction types are suciently common to permit statistical analysis.
All product similarities are bounded in the range (0,1). The average product sim-
ilarity between randomly chosen rms (excluding ten closest rivals) is .017 (or 1.7%).
The average similarity between a rm and its ten closest neighbors is considerably
higher at 15.9%. The average sales based HHI for rms in our sample is .048. The
average percentage of rival rm 10-K words having the word root \patent" is 0.147%.
In Panel B, we report summary statistics for the transaction level database. Im-
portantly, we measure ex-post changes in protability, sales growth, and expenses
of the acquiring rm starting from the year after the transaction becomes eective
(ie, year t+1).10 For example, a three year change in protability is equal to prof-
itability in year t+4 minus that in year t+1. The average acquirer experienced an
announcement return very close to zero (0.4%), and the average target experienced
an announcement return of 9.5%. The average merger pair is 9.3% similar, and the
average target is 8.8% less similar to the acquirer's rivals than the acquirer itself
is (ie, an average 8.8% potential gain in acquirer product dierentiation). Panel C
shows that the average acquiring rm experiences very little change in protability,
and 15.9% to 27.0% sales growth over the one to three year horizon following the
transaction.
Table IV displays Pearson correlation coecients between our measures of product
dierentiation and other key variables. Product similarity relative to all rms (ex-
cluding nearest ten) is 60.1% and 52.0% correlated with similarity measured relative
10Although this is conservative and reduces the power of our tests (some performance gains might
accrue immediately), this avoids potential bias due to the challenges associated with computing
the ex-ante performance given that two rms exist prior to the transaction, and because most
transactions are partial acquisitions.
16to the one hundred and ten nearest neighbors, respectively.11 We also nd that the
sales HHI variable is roughly -10% correlated with the product similarity variables.
This suggests that rms in concentrated industries have somewhat lower product sim-
ilarities, which is consistent with higher product similarity and lower HHI both being
associated with product market competition. However, this correlation is modest and
both measures contain much distinct information. Overall, we conclude that most
correlations are small and that multi-collinearity is not likely to be an issue in our
analysis. We conrm this later using formal tests for multicollinearity.
A The Similarity Measure
Figure 3 displays the distributional properties of our pair-wise similarity measure.
The uppermost graph displays the distribution of similarities for all randomly chosen
rm pairs (ie., we do not condition on restructuring). The vertical axis is the fre-
quency and the horizontal axis is the pairwise similarity expressed as a percentage.
Randomly chosen rms generally have similarity percentages ranging from zero to
four, but a relatively fat tail also stretches beyond scores of ten percent. The sec-
ond graph displays similarities for rms entering into restructuring transactions. Our
broad conclusion is that restructuring pairs are highly similar relative to randomly
selected rms, and that merger pair similarities are quite diverse with considerable
mass attached to values ranging from zero all the way to thirty.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Existing studies measure merger pair similarity by asking if the target and ac-
quirer reside within the same SIC code or in vertically related industries. The third
and fourth graphs conrm that product similarities are very high for merger pairs in
the same two and three-digit SIC codes. However, the high diversity of similarities
illustrates that the granular nature of SIC codes fails to capture much product het-
erogeneity. Also striking, however, is the relatively high level of merger pair similarity
observed for merger pairs residing in dierent two-digit SIC codes in the bottom most
11Although we focus on the ten nearest neighbors in most of our analysis, our results change little
if we instead focus on the 100 nearest neighbors.
17graph. Firms in this sample are in dierent two-digit SIC codes, and hence any study
assessing merger pair similarity on the basis of SIC groupings would label these pairs
as being dissimilar. We nd that the overwhelming majority of rms in this group
have relatively high levels of similarity compared to the randomly chose rms in the
top most graph. Even if we exclude rms that are in vertically related industries we
still nd striking evidence that merging rms in unrelated industries are in many cases
very similar. We conclude that product similarity adds information not contained in
SIC codes and allows us to measure the degree of similarity within industries and also
across dissimilar industries.
IV Product Similarity, Product Market Competi-
tion and Protability
Before beginning our examination of mergers and acquisitions, we test whether our
similarity variables constructed from the 10-K product descriptions explain the prof-
itability of rms in cross section. We examine the relation between our similarity
variables and protability to provide verication that our similarity measures are
valid measures of product characteristics for all rms. The theoretical link is that our
similarities are based on an empirical multi dimensional Hotelling grid that underlies
the product space of all rms (the grid has as many dimensions as there are words
in rm 10-K product descriptions, and a rm's location is determined by its word
usage).
Theories of industrial organization predict that rms residing in locations where
fewer close rivals exist - thus rms with more product dierentiation - should enjoy
higher prot margins in equilibrium. Hence, if our empirical measure of product
market competition is valid, there should be a negative relationship between a rm's
similarity relative to its ten nearest rivals, and its protability.
Table V displays the results of OLS regressions in which one observation is one
rm in one year. The dependent variable is protability dened as operating income
scaled by sales (Panel A) and scaled by assets (Panel B). We present results in groups
of three: all rms, large rms (above median book assets) and small rms. In all spec-
18ications, we include three digit SIC industry xed eects and we report t statistics
that are adjusted to account for clustering at the year and three digit SIC industry
level.
[Insert Table V Here]
Table V strongly conrms that our product similarity variable is negatively related
to protability. This nding is signicant both statistically (at better than the 1%
level) and economically. Where economic impact is dened as a regression coecient
multiplied by the given variable's standard deviation, and based on the standard
deviations from Table III and the coecients from Table V, rows one and three imply
that the economic impact of product dierentiation on protability is 2.6 percentage
points. When protability is scaled by assets rather than sales (Panel B), this number
is still large at 1.7 percentage points. These numbers are roughly ten percent of the
total standard deviations of the dependent variables (operating income scaled by sales
and assets have standard deviations of 35.4 and 23.7 percentage points, respectively).
We conclude that our 10-K based measures of product market competition are indeed
consistent with key predictions of industrial organizational theories, lending further
support to our assumption that the ten nearest similarity variable is a valid proxy for
local product market competition and product dierentiation.
V Merger and Asset Acquisition Likelihood
In this section, we test our rst two hypotheses and examine the likelihood of re-
structuring transactions and its link to measures of product market competition and
similarity. Table VI displays the results of logistic regressions in which one observa-
tion is one rm in one year. All reported gures are marginal eects, and t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to
one if the given rm is a target of a restructuring transaction in a given year (Panel
A) and a dummy equal to one if the given rm is an acquirer (Panel B). In all speci-
cations, we report t statistics that are adjusted to account for clustering at the year
and industry level.
19Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the table shows that a rm is more likely to be
an acquirer or a target (especially an acquirer) if its overall product similarity to all
rms is high. This result is highly signicant for acquirers at the 1% level regardless
of specication. However, it is somewhat weaker for targets, as the product similarity
relative to all rms is signicant only when the similarity relative to ten nearest
neighbors is included in the model. Although this result is weaker, tests we conduct
indicate that the observed signicance in the joint model is robust as a conditional
result and not due to multicollinearity.12 We interpret these results in terms of asset
deployment. A rm whose product is broadly similar likely owns assets that can be
deployed in many dierent product markets. These rms, especially acquirers, engage
in more restructuring transactions. We refer to this as the \Redeployment eect".
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2, rms in highly competitive local product
markets are less likely to restructure both as targets and acquirers. The product
similarity relative to a rm's ten nearest rivals signicantly negatively predicts trans-
action likelihood at the 1% level for both targets and acquirers. This nding does
not depend on the specication. We interpret this as a \competitive eect", as rms
having very similar rivals must compete for restructuring opportunities. Later in this
section, we conrm that both the redeployment eect and the competitive eect are
economically signicant.
Table VI also shows that rms using the word \patent" in their product de-
scriptions are more likely to restructure, both as targets and as acquirers. A likely
explanation is that patents serve as barriers to entry, and hence a rm that needs a
technology protected by patents has few options to acquire it outside of merging with
the patent holder. For example, patents might eectively preclude entry via organic
investment.
The table also shows that the SIC-based sales HHI variable is negatively related
to restructuring for acquirers, and weakly positively linked to restructuring for tar-
12The two variables are only 51% correlated and the highest variance ination factor (VIF) is 1.5,
which is considerably below the critical value of 2.5, and far below the value of 10 deemed necessary
to declare the presence of multicollinearity. The results are also not driven by functional form as
they change little in an OLS linear probability model. We also randomly divide the sample into two
and nd similar results on the resulting subsets of data.
20gets. A likely explanation for the strong negative link for acquirers is that rms
might anticipate federal regulations that block acquiring rms in concentrated indus-
tries. It is also possible that HHIs load on the redeployment eect more than the
competitive eect. We conclude that concentration measures and product similarity
measures should indeed be jointly considered in studies of product market compe-
tition as they contain much distinct information. The table also shows that recent
restructuring activity predicts future restructuring for both SIC-based and product
similarity based measures, conrming that SIC codes and product similarities contain
distinct information.
Although we do not report the results to conserve space, we separately reproduce
the tests in Table VI for small and large rms. Our goal is to examine robustness, and
to determine which group of rms is most responsible for our ndings. In each year,
we divide rms into a big rm sample and small rm sample based on whether their
assets are above or below the median. We then reproduce the logistic regressions in
Table VI for both groups. Both the redeployment eect and the competitive eect
are especially robust for large rms, and results for acquirers are also robust for small
rms. The results suggest that the likelihood that small rms will be targets is less
related to similarity variables. The link between patents and restructuring is also
stronger for larger rms. The importance and strongest robustness of our ndings for
large rms leads us to conclude that our results are important, as the restructuring
decisions of these rms have a greater impact on the overall utilization of assets.
In Table VII, we reproduce the tests in Table VI for mergers and acquisition
of assets transactions. The competitive eect is stronger for acquisition of asset
transactions in Panel B than for mergers in Panel A. One reason is that acquisition
of assets are more common, as noted earlier. Furthermore, it is possible that asset
deployment and competition for assets might be easier to measure when the matter
of control and managerial job loss are less an issue. Although the competitive eect
retains its negative sign for acquirers in mergers, it becomes positive for targets of
mergers. This feature might reect consolidating industries, where complete mergers
to reduce high competition might be the best strategy to restore protability. It is
also possible that the matter of target control drives this nding. The redeployment
21eect remains highly positive and robust for both mergers and acquisition of assets
transactions.
A Economic Magnitudes
In this section, we summarize the economic magnitude of our ndings regarding trans-
action likelihood. We examine the eect of changing one of our three key variables
(product similarity 10 nearest, product similarity all rms excluding the ten nearest
rms, and the % neighbor patent words) on the probability of a given transaction. In
later sections, we also examine economic magnitudes related to announcement returns
and real outcomes. Because some of our models are logistic models, and others OLS
based, we adopt a general framework based on predicted values. We rst compute a
model's predicted value when all of the independent variables are set to their mean
value. We then set one of our three variables to its expected 10%ile value, and recom-
pute the predicted value holding all other variables xed. We repeat this procedure
for the 90%ile. We are thus able to report how a given dependent variable changes
when a key independent variable moves from its 10%ile value, to its mean value, and
to its 90%ile value. Key benets of this approach include its generality and its ability
to show not only impact, but also the magnitude of the dependent variable itself.
Table VIII conrms that our ndings regarding economic magnitudes for transac-
tion incidence are economically relevant. The eect of changing similarity (10 nearest)
from the 10%ile to the 90%ile changes acquirer incidence from 19.4% to 10.8%. The
economic magnitude of our \competitive eect" is thus quite substantial, and it is
especially large for big rms in row 4. This eect is somewhat smaller, but still large,
for target incidence at 16.6% to 13.5%. The overall similarity variable, the \redeploy-
ment eect", is also large and moves from 12.5% to 17.7% for acquirer incidence. The
redeployment eect is considerably smaller for target incidence. The patent variable
also has a rather substantial economic impact as it changes acquirer incidence from
12.7% to 17.5%. Interestingly, this variable has just as much impact on both target
and acquirer incidence. Its importance is consistent with acquisitions being a neces-
sity when rms need to acquire patent protected technology as organic investment is
less feasible. Acquisitions should be more common when they are the only option.
22VI Ex-post Outcomes
We now examine ex post outcomes, including combined announcement returns and
longer-term changes in cash ows, sales and product descriptions. Our tests relate ex
post outcomes to the similarity between the acquirer and target and also the similarity
between the target and the acquirer's existing rival rms.
A Announcement Returns
This section tests Hypotheses H3, H4, and H5 by examining the returns of the com-
bined acquirer and target rms preceding and surrounding transaction announce-
ments. Importantly, these hypotheses predict that total value creation will be larger
when mergers are more likely to permit new product synergies in markets facing little
competition. Although these hypotheses thus have strong predictions regarding the
combined rm's returns, they are silent on how the gains would be split between the
target and the acquirer. Hence, we focus our analysis on the combined rm.
Table IX reports OLS regressions with the acquirer and target's combined abnor-
mal announcement return as the dependent variable. We consider one to eleven day
event windows ending on the announcement date (from day t=-10 to day t=0), and
we adjust standard errors to reect possible clustering at the industry and year level.
The combined rm's raw return is the total market capitalization of both rms (in
dollars) at the end of the event window minus the original market capitalization (in
dollars), all divided by the original market capitalization. Hence, this is a simple
value weighted return for the combined rm. The abnormal return is equal to this
raw return less the return of the CRSP value weighted market index over the same
event window. Because the many of our transactions are partial acquisitions, these
returns are noisy measures of the transactions's true return, and their economic mag-
nitude can vastly understate the true impact of the transaction when the transaction
is smaller. Given we wish to also control for partial anticipation of the deals, we
examine event windows starting at ten days before announcement.13 Note that our
13To measure deal anticipation further, we also considered a variable summarizing the fraction
of a rm's ten nearest rivals that were involved in restructuring in the past year. Consistent with
anticipation, this variable negatively predicts announcement returns, but only at the 10% level in
23sample of transactions for this test is somewhat smaller than our main transaction
sample because we must further require that the target rm is both publicly traded
and that it has available CRSP stock returns on the event date.
[Insert Table IX Here]
We nd strong support for the conclusion that more value is created around the
announcement date when the acquirer is in a relatively competitive product market,
and it is buying target assets in a product market that is less competitive. Rows 1, 3,
5, and 7 support this conclusion at the ve percent level or better in all but one event
window (the acquirer result is not signicant for the t=-1 to t=0 event window in row
3). This rather strong evidence supports the notion that the market rewards acquirers
that buy assets permitting new product synergies in less competitive markets.
In rows 2, 4, 6, and 8, we replace the basic product market competition variable
with two other variables to more directly test H3 and H4. Namely, we include the
gain in product dierentiation relative to the acquirer's rivals and the merger pair
similarity. The results broadly support H3 for all horizons, as the gain in product
dierentiation is positive and signicant at the 5% level or the 1% level in all rows.
We also see some support for H4 over longer event windows, as the pairwise similarity
variable is positive and signicant at the 5% level in row 8 for the t=-10 to t=0 event
window. These results suggest that signicant gains accrue consistent with H3 and
H4 despite the low degree of power in these tests, and also that these gains appear
both on the event day, and in the form of leakage prior to the event day. Although the
% neighbor patents variable is positive in every row, it is not statistically signicant.
Hence, we nd only very weak support for H5 in this test.
Lastly, we also nd that announcement returns are larger when the transaction
is a merger involving a target rm that is large relative to the acquirer, and smaller
when the rms are larger unconditionally. The larger returns when bigger targets are
involved in mergers likely reects the leveraged gains that should be observed in the
combined rm's returns when transactions involve a larger fraction of the combined
some specications, or less in others. We omit this variable as it does not alter any inferences and
to conserve space.
24rm (mergers, unlike asset acquisitions, involve all of the target's assets).
B Real Performance
Although we observe evidence of nancial value creation consistent with our hypothe-
ses in Section A, it is important to examine the additional predictions of H3, H4, and
H5. In particular, this value increase should be accompanied by real post-transaction
gains in both sales and protability. Also, we should observe evidence consistent with
new product synergies. This section presents the real long-term outcomes of acquiring
rms as a function of their ex-ante competitive environment.14
An important challenge faced by researchers studying ex-post restructuring per-
formance is that two separate rms exist ex ante, and one or two rms might exist
ex post depending upon the transaction type. The matter of measuring ex-ante prof-
itability or sales is especially confounding for partial asset purchases. We avoid this
issue entirely by only considering the acquirer's post-eective change in performance
measured relative to the rst set of numbers available after the transaction's eective
date. Our hypotheses thus assume that protability and sales growth accrue over
time, as should be the case when new product development drives gains given issues
related to the time to build. We examine changes from year t+1 to year t+2 or t+4
(one and three year horizons). For this reason, the sample of transactions used in
this section is somewhat smaller than our sample in section A because we must fur-
ther require that the acquirer has valid COMPUSTAT data at least two years after
a given transaction closes. By examining post-eective changes only, we bias our
analysis toward not nding results due to lost power, but we avoid biases associated
with attempts to measure year t=-1 performance, and complications due to changes
in accounting methods following the transaction. As documented by Maksimovic,
Phillips, and Prabhala (2008), many mergers also involve selling o divisions at the
time of transaction and hence t-1 assets may no longer be owned by either rm by year
3. Our results thus likely understate the true relationship between our key variables.
14Although not displayed, we also nd that the same variables used to predict changes in ex post
protability and sales growth also positively predict long-term abnormal stock returns, although
these ndings are only signicant at the 10% level. These tests conrm that our long-term ndings
are not unique to accounting data.
25We consider three measures of ex post performance: the change in operating
income divided by sales, change in operating income divided by assets, and sales
growth. All measures are SIC-3 industry adjusted. The rst is COMPUSTAT item
13 divided by item 12. The second is COMPUSTAT item 13 divided by item 6.
To mitigate the eect of outliers, we truncate both protability variables to lie in
the interval (-1,1). Changes are computed from year t+1 to year t+4. To reduce
survivorship issues, we assign any missing values for a given horizon the value of the
last known horizon (for example, if three year sales growth is missing, we populate
the given observation with two year sales growth, or one year sales growth).15
Table X reports the results of OLS regressions where the ex post change in per-
formance (horizons noted in column two) is the dependent variable. In each panel,
we rst present two rows including acquirer product similarity (one- and three-year
windows, respectively). In the third and fourth regressions of each panel (regressions
(3) and (4) in Panel A, regressions (7) and (8) in Panel B, and regressions (11) and
(12) in Panel C) we replace this variable with two other variables to more directly
test H3 and H4. Namely, we include the gain in product dierentiation relative to
the acquirer's rivals and the merger pair similarity.
We nd evidence that acquirers residing in highly competitive product markets
experience positive improvements in protability and sales growth. The gains in prof-
itability in Panel A accrue over three years, and gains in sales in Panel C accrue more
quickly. These results are signicant at the 1% level or better for sales growth, and
the three year protability result is signicant at the 5% level. These results are also
economically signicant, as we report later in this section. Acquirers in competitive
product markets thus appear able to inuence the degree of competition they face by
restructuring and developing new products, which is consistent with the growth in
sales. The potential for these new products to generate product dierentiation can
explain why increased protability accompanies the higher sales. The weaker results
in Panel B for protability normalized by sales rather than assets is likely due to the
high sales growth documented in Panel C that coincides with the protability growth
noted in Panel A, as sales is in the denominator of the protability variable in Panel
15Our results are robust to simply discarding these observations rather than using the last value.
26B. The strong results for sales growth are especially consistent with the development
of new products.
Rows (3) and (4) in Panel A, and rows (11) and (12) of Panel C, show strong sup-
port for Hypothesis 3. In particular, the gain in product dierentiation coecient is
positive and signicant. Hypothesis 4 is also supported by the positive and signicant
target+acquirer similarity coecient. As before, we do not see signicant coecients
in rows (7) and (8) in Panel B for these variables because Panels A and C suggest
that predictions regarding operating income scaled by sales are ambiguous.
We view the especially strong support for sales growth to be consistent with new
product development being a key feature of merger strategies. This result helps
to separate our hypotheses from the pure pricing power hypothesis advocated by
Baker and Bresnahan (1985). Our more direct evidence supporting new product
development presented later in this section further illustrates this distinction. The
increased protability noted in Panel A supports both hypotheses. In the case of new
product development, managers should favor developing new products in markets
where rivals do not yet exist, which will generate increased pricing power.
We do not nd support for Hypothesis 5 on this table (the % target neighbor's
patent words is generally insignicant, and even negative in some specications).
However, some of the weakness in testing H5 might be related to industry adjusting
the dependent variables that we use in this analysis. In particular, if patents matter
at the industry level, the theoretical predictions of H5 would still obtain, however
they would not be visible in our regression design.
C Product Descriptions
In this section, we consider the prediction of Hypotheses 4 and 5 that new product
development will accompany positive real outcomes. New product development is
most likely when the target rm is more similar to the acquirer itself due to com-
plementary assets (H4), and when barriers to entry protect the target's uniqueness
(H5).
To test these predictions, we consider the time series of the product descriptions,
27and examine how their size varies over time. We proxy for new product development
by examining whether rms experience growth in the size of their product descriptions
in the years following the merger's eective date. This rst description fully integrates
the initial state of the post merger rm. We dene \product description growth" as
the logarithmic growth in the number of words used in the product market description
from year t+1 to either year t+2 or t+4. We then explore whether the same set of
variables used to predict ex-post real performance also predict product description
growth. In our analysis, we use an OLS specication in which all standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the year and SIC-3 industry level. Note the sample
of transactions used in this section is smaller than our sample in section B because
we were able to obtain COMPUSTAT data going out to a longer horizon than our
available 10-K data, which is needed to construct the dependent variable in this
section.
Table XI presents the results of these tests. We nd support for hypotheses H4
to H5. Rows (1) to (3) show that product descriptions increase dramatically when
acquiring rms reside in ex-ante competitive industries (a key prediction of both
hypotheses). This result is signicant at the 1% level. Rows (4) to (6) show that this
result can be explained by two key factors. Product development is most aggressive
when (1) the acquirer and target are more similar, and (2) barriers to entry protect
the target's technologies. Evidence supporting H4 is particularly strong, as pairwise
similarity is signicant at better than the 1% level. For the three year horizon, the
% neighbor patent words variable is positive and signicant at the 1% level.
The Table also shows that vertical mergers, as described in Fan and Goyal (2006)
also experience ex-post growth in the size of product descriptions, consistent with
these mergers also permitting the introduction of new products. These results support
the broader conclusions of Fan and Goyal (2006), who show that vertical mergers are
indeed value creating.
The table also shows that pairwise similarity measured using SIC codes is too
granular to produce similar inferences. Hence, understanding the relationship between
pairwise similarity and product dierentiation relies on the researcher's ability to
measure the degree of product similarity, and also to measure similarities relative to
28dierent groups of rms. The table also documents that product descriptions also
have a tendency to mean revert over time, a feature that is likely due to writing style
and a long term preference for brevity. We control for this feature of the data in
addition to the other key variables discussed above.
An alternative explanation for our ndings is that repeat acquisitions explain why
product descriptions expand. We test this hypothesis and compute dummy variables
indicating whether a given rm completes a future acquisition during the same horizon
over which these calculations are performed. We do not nd a statistically signi-
cant link between the incidence of repeat acquisitions and our key product market
competition and pairwise similarity variables. We also reproduce these tests using
the subsample of rms that do not experience any future acquisitions and our results
remain robust. We conclude that repeat acquisitions do not explain our ndings.
D Economic Magnitudes for Ex Post Outcomes
In this section, we summarize the economic magnitude of two key variables (product
similarity 10 nearest, and the % neighbor patent words) on announcement returns
and real outcomes. We use the same generalized method used to examine transaction
incidence in section V.
Table XII displays the results of these calculations. The economic magnitudes in
Panel A regarding announcement returns are modest relative to our incidence results,
at least in nominal terms. The competitive eect we document for the combined rm
increases event day announcement returns by 0.3%, and longer horizon (11-day) event
returns by 0.8%. This spread is modest in nominal terms, but is not trivial given
that the mean combined event day rm announcement return is just 0.5% (standard
deviation of 4.2%), and the eleven day announcement return averages 0.6% (standard
deviation of 7.9%). Hence, over the longer window, the 0.8% is 10% the total standard
deviation, and this variable moves the announcement return by more than the mean
itself. The relatively small nominal size of these returns is consistent with the bulk
of our database being partial acquisitions, and with target rms being smaller than
acquiring rms in general. These features make it very hard to measure the impact
29of a transaction when all we observe is an aggregated return that includes changes
in the value of the non-acquired assets. The patent variable has a smaller magnitude
consistent with its low statistical signicance in Table IX. Because transactions can
be anticipated months or even years in advance, we believe that additional gains
likely accrue to the combined rm outside of the traditional event windows that we
examine.
The results in Panel B show that the economic magnitude of our ndings regarding
real outcomes are large, especially regarding sales growth. The acquirer's product
similarity (10 nearest) increases the change in protability from -0.9% to -0.2% (1
year) and from -2.3% to -0.9% (3 years). Noting that this variable is a change (hence
its mean is near zero) that has a standard deviation of roughly 10% (See Table III), we
conclude that this predicted spread is economically relevant, especially for the three
year horizon where the predicted spread is nearly 20% of the standard deviation of
the dependent variable. Put dierently, protability does not change very much year
to year, and a 1.4% shift in protability can be quite substantial. The table also
shows that acquirer product similarity generates a sales growth spread from 11.9%
to 19.9% (one year) and 20.0% to 33.9% (three years). These spreads are substantial
and economically signicant both in nominal and relative terms.
Panel C reports the economic impact of our variables on the ex post growth in
the size of the product description. The spread for the acquirer product similarity
variable is from -2.4% to 9.1% (results similar for one and three year horizons). This
spread is economically large. We conclude that our ndings regarding incidence,
real performance, and product description growth are economically large. Our most
economically signicant ndings relate to transaction incidence, sales growth, and
product description growth. Our ndings regarding announcement returns are modest
in nominal terms, but are larger when compared to the dependent variable's narrow
distribution.
30E Robustness
In this section, we examine key predictions of some alternative theories and summarize
additional robustness tests.
One main alternative for higher cash ows ex post is that rms cut expenses
post-merger. This could arise if the combined rm experiences economies of scale or
if acquirers deliberately purchase less ecient targets in order to improve eciency.
We use methods similar to those of Table X and measure changes in the cost of
goods sold (scaled by sales), selling and administrative expenses (scaled by sales),
and capital expenditures (scaled by assets) starting from year t+1 to year t+2 or
t+4 (one year or three year performance). We nd that our key variables are weakly
negatively related to changes in these expense ratios, but none of the coecients are
statistically signicant. We conclude that cost savings and economies of scale likely
cannot explain our previous results. Despite this nding, it is important to note that
expense-based merger strategies are not mutually exclusive to our product market
based strategies, and the best mergers might generate gains along both dimensions.
Second, we also examine whether our results are driven by measures of vertically
related mergers, as in Fan and Goyal (2006). Although we nd independent support
for the conclusion that vertical mergers have positive attributes, we also nd that
our similarity measures correlate very little with vertical similarity measured using
the input-output tables (correlation less than 10%). We also control for vertical
similarity in our analysis and nd that our results are unchanged regardless of whether
we include or exclude controls for vertical similarity. Our measures thus capture
additional information that is economically and statistically signicant in explaining
ex post changes in merger protability and new product introduction.
Third, we test whether our results are driven by the technology boom of the late
1990s. We perform several tests to exclude this possibility. Throughout our study,
we control for time and industry eects. We also run an unreported robustness test
where we exclude all technology rms from our sample (technology rms dened as in
Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Our results are almost unchanged, and in some cases,
become stronger in this test. Our results are thus not driven by technology rms.
31Fourth, our results might be driven by multiple segment rms, and in particu-
lar, our broad measure of product similarity might be measuring rm diversication
rather than asset redeployability. We test this hypothesis by rerunning our tests after
excluding all multiple segment rms, where multiple segment rms are identied us-
ing the COMPUSTAT segment tapes. Our results change little in this test, and the
relevant broad product similarity variable's coecient declines by only 5% to 10% in
various tests. Although diversication might play a small role, our results are not
driven by rm diversication.
Fifth, our product similarity variables might be driven by corporate culture, and
our results thus driven by similar cultures being more conductive to innovation and the
introduction of new products. We do not believe our results support this hypothesis
for two reasons. First, the word lists that drive our similarity measure (see Table
II) t a product market interpretation, and not a corporate culture interpretation.
Second, although corporate culture predicts that outcomes might be related to target
and acquirer pairwise similarity, it is silent on whether the target's distance from the
acquirer's nearest rivals (gain in dierentiation) will matter to ex post outcomes thus
corporate culture likely cannot explain our results.
Sixth, we examine whether our results are driven by repeat-acquiring rms by
rerunning our tests after excluding rms that were involved in an acquisition in the
past year. Our results change little in these tests. We conclude that our ndings are
most consistent with product market competition and similarity inuencing merger
incidence and ex post changes in protability and product oerings.
32VII Conclusions
Using novel text-based measures of product similarity between rms, we analyze how
similarity and competition impacts the incentives to merge and whether mergers
with potential product market synergies through asset complementarities add value.
Our 10-K based text measures of product market competition, dierentiation, and
new product development have advantages over simple SIC code based measures as
they can capture similarity both within and across product markets, and changes in
product descriptions over time.
We nd that rms with higher economy-wide product market similarity are more
likely to enter into restructuring transactions, consistent with their assets being more
broadly deployable. Firms with higher localized product market competition are less
likely to enter into restructuring transactions. These results are consistent with local
competition for restructuring opportunities. We nd that rms protected by barriers
to entry are also more likely to enter into restructuring transactions. These results
are consistent with acquirers of rms in protected product markets obtaining patent
protected technologies through mergers or asset purchases instead of developing the
technologies or products within the existing rm.
Examining post-merger outcomes, we nd that value creation upon announcement
and long-term protability and sales growth are higher when acquirers purchase tar-
gets that 1) Increase the acquirer's product dierentiation relative to its nearest rivals
and 2) Have high similarity relative to the acquirer's own products. These gains are
larger when barriers to entry exist, making it harder for rival rms to replicate the
given strategy. We also nd evidence that product descriptions for the combined
acquirer and target rm increase when acquirers are in competitive product markets
and transacting rms have high product similarity.
Overall, our results are consistent with merging rms exploiting asset complemen-
tarities to create value through sales growth and new product introductions to increase
their product dierentiation. More broadly, our results suggest that rms can actively
reduce their product market competition by engaging in strategic restructuring trans-
actions to increase product dierentiation through new product introductions.
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This Appendix explains how we compute the \product similarity" and \product
dierentiation" between two rms i and j. We rst take the text in each rm's
product description (from its 10-K) and construct a binary vector summarizing its
usage of English words. The vector has a length equal to the number of unique words
used in the set of all product descriptions. For a given rm, a given element of this
vector is set to one if the word associated with the given element is in the given rm's
product description. It is set to zero otherwise. Because we wish to measure product
descriptions, we seek to restrict the number of words in this vector to those that are
less commonly used across all product descriptions. Very common words are likely
to be articles, conjunctions, personal pronouns, abbreviations, or other words that
do not identify the rm's product oerings. Hence, we restrict attention to words
that appear in fewer than ve percent of all product descriptions in the given year.
For each rm i, we thus have a binary vector Pi, with each element taking a value
of one if the associated word is used in the given rm's product description and zero
otherwise.
We next dene the normalized frequency vector Vi, which normalizes the vector





To measure the degree of similarity between the products of rms i and j, we simply
take the dot product of the two normalized vectors, a quantity we dene as \product
similarity". We utilize this measure throughout this study.
Product Similarityi;j = (Vi  Vj) (2)
To measure product dierentiation across rms i and j, we simply take one minus
the product similarity.
Product Differentiationi;j = 1   (Vi  Vj) (3)
Because all normalized vectors Vi have a length of one, product similarity and product
dierentiation both have the nice property of being bounded in the interval (0,1). This
normalization is important because it ensures that product descriptions with fewerwords are not penalized excessively relative to those using more words. Intuitively,
the dierentiation between two products is zero if they are the same, and can never
exceed one if they are entirely dierent.
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Word lists of merging rms with high similarity.
This appendix presents the common words for the mergers from Table I that are not already
presented in Table II. Merging rms are both (1) in dierent two-digit SIC codes and (2) have a
merger pair similarity in the highest percentile in 2005 (the most recent year in our sample).
Acquirer (Industry) + Target (Industry): list of common words
Enterprise Products Partners (SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas)  + El Paso Corp-Natural Gas 
(SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission): abandonment, acreage, anadarko, basin, basins, border, bound, ceiling, 
coal, coastal, compression, compressor, condensate, connects, continent, deepwater, depleted, differs, 
discontinuation, downstream, exact, ferc, gulf, gulfterra, horsepower, hurricanes, inch, indian, inlet, 
interconnections, interconnects, interruptible, intrastate, juan, justify, kerr, liquids, mainline, mcgee, midstream, 
minerals, mmcf, morgan, mountains, northeastern, onshore, paso, permian, pipelines, reservoir, rockies, rocky, 
Express Scripts Inc (SIC3=641, Insurance Agents, Brokers & Service)  + Priority Healthcare Corp (SIC3=512, 
Wholesale-Drugs & Druggists Sundries): accreditation, admit, advancepcs, alert, alerts, asthma, beneficiaries, 
bids, broadened, calculations, caremark, cited, compiled, counseling, deadline, differently, dispense, dispensing, 
enact, exclusion, false, filling, formularies, formulary, fraudulent, freedom, harbors, hipaa, hmos, implicate, 
induce, inspector, interactions, journal, kickback, knowingly, marked, medco, medication, medications, 
medicines, nurses, nursing, outpatient, paths, pbms, pharmacies, pharmacist, pharmacists, pharmacy, phoenix, 
First Advantage Corp (SIC3=738, Services-Miscellaneous Business Services)  + Credit Information Group 
(SIC3=636, Title Insurance): corefacts, credco, dedicate, diversifying, eviction, fadv, forensics, here, insuring, 
investigative, justify, landlords, malfeasance, misuse, mitigation, multifamily, nonetheless, omega, paperwork, 
General Dynamics Corp (SIC3=373, Ship & Boat Building & Repairing)  + Anteon International Corp (SIC3=737, 
Services-Computer Programming): agrees, allied, appropriated, armed, army, attack, ballistic, battle, cargo, 
civilian, combat, combatant, command, commanders, corps, deployments, destroyer, fighter, littoral, missile, 
H&R Block Inc (SIC3=720, Services-Personal Services)  + American Express Tax & Bus (SIC3=619, Finance 
Services): accessibility, advantaged, affirmed, annuities, annuity, applicability, attest, attracted, attrition, 
captured, censure, charging, clearing, contacting, custodian, delinquency, delinquent, franchisee, franchisees, 
franchising, hsbc, inappropriate, iras, join, nasd, partnering, planners, preempt, professionally, ranked, rewards, 
Hampshire Group Ltd (SIC3=225, Knitting Mills)  + Kellwood Co-David Brooks Bus (SIC3=233, Women's, 
Misses, and Juniors Outerwear): apparel, casual, dockers, juniors, knit, pants, quota, skirts, sportswear, styles, 
Hewlett-Packard Co (SIC3=357, Computer & of fice Equipment)  + Peregrine Systems Inc (SIC3=737, Services-
Computer Programming): alignment, allocating, americas, answer, architectures, comparing, continuity, 
corrections, deliverables, descriptions, desk, diego, emea, geographies, heterogeneous, hewlett, infrastructures, 
laptop, lifecycle, metrics, middleware, networked, packard, pdas, prevents, printer, redundancies, resides, 
Highland Hospitality Corp (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Hilton Boston Back Bay Hotel (SIC3=701, 
Hotels & Motels): airport, convention, courtyard, embassy, franchised, franchisees, franchisor, garden, guest, 
hilton, homewood, hospitality, hotel, knew, lodging, omaha, parking, renovation, repositioning, reservation, 
IRIS International Inc (SIC3=382, Laboratory Apparatus & Furniture)  + Quidel Corp-Urinalysis Bus (SIC3=283, 
Medicinal Chemicals & Botanical Products): bacteria, bayer, bench, characterize, classify, clearances, cleared, 
diagnostics, exploit, glucose, infection, infections, nitrite, proposition, protein, reagents, seizure, specimen, 
Journal Communications Inc (SIC3=271, Newspapers: Publishing Printing)  + Emmis Comm-Radio Stations(3) 
(SIC3=483, Radio Broadcasting Stations): absent, adult, advertiser, advertisers, affiliation, affirmed, allotted, 
appropriations, arbitron, asking, assignments, assigns, attribution, audience, audiences, broadcaster, 
broadcasters, broadcasting, broadcasts, brokered, carriage, circulation, circulations, classic, clusters, 
compelling, conclusion, contemporary, denial, dividing, egregious, electing, equitable, failing, frequencies, 
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners (SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission)  + Terra Nitrogen Co-Blytheville 
(SIC3=287, Agricultural Chemicals): accidents, acre, ammonia, analogous, anhydrous, barge, barges, basin, 
beaumont, blend, carbon, cars, cercla, coincide, creek, crop, crops, depleted, dioxide, drainage, environmentally, 
exported, exports, farm, feed, feedstock, fertilizer, fertilizers, gallons, gasoline, grain, groundwater, gulf, 
LaSalle Hotel Properties (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Hilton San Diego Resort,CA (SIC3=701, Hotels 
& Motels): accommodations, airline, airport, bankrupt, contrary, convention, diego, earthquake, franchisor, 
guests, hilton, hospitality, hotel, indianapolis, instructions, insuring, knew, leisure, lodging, luxury, omaha, pines, 
Leggett & Platt Inc (SIC3=251, Household Furniture)  + Foamex International-Rubber (SIC3=308, Miscellaneous 
Plastics Products): bedding, carpet, cushioning, cushions, fabricated, fibers, foam, leggett, mattress, mattresses, 
mexican, molded, pillows, platt, quilting, scrap, seat, seating, shape, springs, upholstered
Lionbridge Technologies Inc (SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming)  + Bowne Global Solutions 
(SIC3=275, Commercial Printing): adapting, bowne, cultural, culturally, freelance, globalization, instructions, 
languages, leverages, lifecycle, linguistic, localization, multimedia, shorten, standardizes, translated, translation, Appendix 2 Continued
This appendix presents the common words for the mergers from Table I that are not
already presented in Table II. Merging rms are both (1) in dierent two-digit SIC
codes and (2) have a merger pair similarity in the highest percentile in 2005 (the
most recent year in our sample).
Acquirer (Industry) + Target (Industry): list of common words
MarkWest Energy Partners LP (SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas)  + Javelina Gas Processing 
(SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission): accidental, acreage, anadarko, appalachian, basin, basins, 
cogeneration, compression, compressor, condensate, condensed, counterparty, diminished, disciplined, exact, 
ferc, grouped, haul, horsepower, inch, injected, inlet, insignificant, intrastate, lateral, liquids, midstream, mmcf, 
McDATA Corp (SIC3=366, Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus)  + Computer Network Technology (SIC3=357, 
Computer & office Equipment): backbone, backup, broadened, brocade, campus, cisco, dell, depended, 
diagnose, disk, disruptive, encompassing, escon, extensibility, fabric, fibre, ficon, forecasting, fractional, 
heterogeneous, hewlett, hitachi, infrastructures, interoperability, iscsi, mainframe, mcdata, merits, migrate, 
Nektar Therapeutics (SIC3=283, Medicinal Chemicals & Botanical Products)  + AeroGen Inc (SIC3=384, 
Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus): absorbed, absorption, activated, adult, aerogen, aerosol, aerosols, 
aeruginosa, alkermes, antibiotic, antibiotics, aradigm, bachelor, battelle, biologic, biology, bloodstream, breath, 
buccal, carbon, cgmp, clinically, collaborations, commercialized, conceived, cystic, diabetes, diabetic, dioxide, 
dosage, dose, doses, dosing, fibrosis, filling, formulated, formulations, founder, glucose, harvard, inconvenience, 
NRG Energy Inc (SIC3=491, Electric Services)  + West Coast Power LLC (SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum & 
Natural Gas): absent, acid, ahead, allegedly, approves, asbestos, attainment, balancing, baseload, basin, bids, 
bilateral, bilaterally, blanket, boiler, btus, cabrillo, cair, capped, caps, carbon, cdwr, cercla, coal, combustion, 
commences, compel, consumed, cooling, cooperatives, cpuc, crisis, crude, curve, defines, depressed, 
Pacific Energy Partners LP (SIC3=461, Pipe Lines (No Natural Gas))  + Valero LP- Terminal & Pipeline 
(SIC3=291, Petroleum Refining): barges, barrels, benchmark, blend, blended, blending, cercla, complements, 
connects, conocophillips, crude, deepwater, denver, diesel, distillate, dock, exxonmobil, feedstock, feedstocks, 
futures, gasoline, grades, grandfathered, groundwater, gulf, heavier, hydrocarbon, inch, oils, paso, pipe, 
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp (SIC3=232, Men's & Boys Work Clothg & Allied Garments)  + Ralph Lauren Footwear 
Co Inc (SIC3=302, Rubber & Plastics Footwear): accessory, amortize, apparel, appearances, athletic, 
atmosphere, attitude, boys, caribbean, casual, catalogs, chile, classic, clubs, coincide, colombia, compensatory, 
contemporary, designer, distinctive, dress, eyewear, famous, flagship, footwear, girls, gloves, golf, gucci, hilfiger, 
hosiery, importing, jeans, knit, launches, lauren, leather, lifestyle, madrid, malaysia, message, mills, newest, 
Renaissance Learning Inc (SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming)  + AlphaSmart Inc (SIC3=357, 
Computer & office Equipment): administrators, bundled, classroom, curricula, districts, educators, english, 
grammar, handles, instructional, learning, literacy, math, multimedia, principals, quizzes, renaissance, sessions, 
RH Donnelley Corp (SIC3=731, Services-Advertising)  + Dex Media Inc (SIC3=274, Miscellaneous Publishing): 
accountable, advertise, advertisement, advertiser, advertisers, affiliation, amdocs, bell, billboards, bottom, bound, 
bundled, circulation, citysearch, cmrs, column, completeness, decentralized, delinquent, directional, directories, 
directory, donnelley, enduring, english, fingers, george, golf, google, guides, households, incumbent, listings, 
logos, longest, newspaper, newspapers, official, permission, phrase, portals, postal, premise, proposition, 
Stonemor Partners LP (SIC3=650, Real Estate)  + Service Corp Intl-Cemeteries (SIC3=720, Services-Personal 
Services): bronze, burial, casket, caskets, cemeteries, cemetery, closings, cremation, crypts, funeral, funerals, 
gardens, heritage, interment, lawn, lots, mausoleum, memorial, memorials, openings, receptacles, spaces, 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Renaissance Hotels-Hotel (SIC3=701, 
Hotels & Motels): accommodations, affiliation, airline, airports, amenities, booked, bookings, contagious, 
courtyard, cured, earthquakes, floods, franchisees, franchisor, franchisors, guest, guests, hospitality, hotel, 
indemnities, intermediaries, justify, laundry, leisure, lodging, marriott, parking, portugal, qualifies, renovation, 
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Renaissance Washington DC (SIC3=701, 
Hotels & Motels): accommodations, affiliation, airline, airports, amenities, booked, bookings, contagious, 
courtyard, cured, earthquakes, floods, franchisees, franchisor, franchisors, guest, guests, hospitality, hotel, 
indemnities, intermediaries, justify, laundry, leisure, lodging, marriott, parking, portugal, qualifies, renovation, 
Titan Tire Corp (SIC3=331, Steel Works, Blast Furnaces & Finishing Mills)  + Goodyear Tire & Rubber-North 
(SIC3=301, Tires & Inner Tubes): australian, belts, bridgestone, carbon, earthmoving, exports, farm, goodyear, 
haul, highway, luxembourg, michelin, mills, pounds, rubber, textile, tire, tires, titan, tread, wheelReferences
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Finance.Table I: Merging rms in 2005 with highest percentile similarity but dierent two-digit SIC codes
This table presents a list of rms that are both (1) in dierent two-digit SIC codes and (2) have a merger pair similarity in the 100th percentile in 2005 (the
most recent year in our sample).
Acquirer Target Acquirer SIC-3 Target SIC-3
Allis-Chalmers Energy Inc RPC Inc-Technical Services  SIC3=735, Equipment Rental + Leasing  SIC3=138, Drilling Oil + Gas Wells
Americredit Financial Services Bay View Acceptance Corp  SIC3=619, Finance Services  SIC3=602, National Commercial Banks
Atlas Pipeline Partners LP Energy Transfer Partners  SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission  SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas
Belo Corp WUPL-TV, New Orleans  SIC3=271, Newspapers: Publishing + Printing  SIC3=483, Radio Broadcasting Stations
Buckeye GP LLC Atlas Oil Co-Refined Petroleum  SIC3=461, Pipe Lines  SIC3=590, Retail-Miscellaneous Retail
CareerStaff Unlimited Inc ProCare One Nurses LLC  SIC3=805, Services-Nursing + Personal Care  SIC3=874, Services-Management Services
ChevronTexaco Corp Unocal Corp  SIC3=291, Petroleum Refining  SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas
Correctional Properties Trust Geo Group Inc-Lawton  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=874, Services-Management Services
Eagle Hosp Prop Trust Inc Hilton Glendale  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=701, Hotels + Motels
EMCORE Corp JDS Uniphase Corp  SIC3=355, Special Industry Machinery  SIC3=366, Telephone + Telegraph Apparatus
Enterprise Products Partners El Paso Corp-Natural Gas  SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas  SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission
Express Scripts Inc Priority Healthcare Corp  SIC3=641, Insurance Agents, Brokers + Service  SIC3=512, Wholesale-Drugs + Sundries
First Advantage Corp Credit Information Group  SIC3=738, Miscellaneous Business Services  SIC3=636, Title Insurance
General Dynamics Corp Anteon International Corp  SIC3=373, Ship + Boat Building + Repairing  SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming
H&R Block Inc American Express Tax & Bus  SIC3=720, Services-Personal Services  SIC3=619, Finance Services
Hampshire Group Ltd Kellwood Co-David Brooks Bus  SIC3=225, Knitting Mills  SIC3=233, Women's and Juniors Outerwear
Hewlett-Packard Co Peregrine Systems Inc  SIC3=357, Computer + of fice Equipment  SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming
Highland Hospitality Corp Hilton Boston Back Bay Hotel  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=701, Hotels + Motels
IRIS International Inc Quidel Corp-Urinalysis Bus  SIC3=382, Laboratory Apparatus + Furniture  SIC3=283, Medicinal Chemicals + Botanicals
Journal Communications Inc Emmis Comm-Radio Stations  SIC3=271, Newspapers: Publishing Printing  SIC3=483, Radio Broadcasting Stations
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners Terra Nitrogen Co-Blytheville  SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission  SIC3=287, Agricultural Chemicals
LaSalle Hotel Properties Hilton San Diego Resort  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=701, Hotels + Motels
Leggett & Platt Inc Foamex International-Rubber  SIC3=251, Household Furniture  SIC3=308, Miscellaneous Plastics Products
Lionbridge Technologies Inc Bowne Global Solutions  SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming  SIC3=275, Commercial Printing
MarkWest Energy Partners LP Javelina Gas Processing  SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas  SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission
McDATA Corp Computer Network Technology  SIC3=366, Telephone + Telegraph Apparatus  SIC3=357, Computer + office Equipment
Nektar Therapeutics AeroGen Inc  SIC3=283, Medicinal Chemicals + Botanicals  SIC3=384, Surgical + Medical Instruments
NRG Energy Inc West Coast Power LLC  SIC3=491, Electric Services  SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas
Pacific Energy Partners LP Valero LP- Terminal & Pipeline  SIC3=461, Pipe Lines (No Natural Gas)  SIC3=291, Petroleum Refining
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp Ralph Lauren Footwear Co Inc  SIC3=232, Men's + Boys Work Clothg   SIC3=302, Rubber + Plastics Footwear
Renaissance Learning Inc AlphaSmart Inc  SIC3=737, Services-Computer Programming  SIC3=357, Computer + office Equipment
RH Donnelley Corp Dex Media Inc  SIC3=731, Services-Advertising  SIC3=274, Miscellaneous Publishing
Stonemor Partners LP Service Corp Intl-Cemeteries  SIC3=650, Real Estate  SIC3=720, Services-Personal Services
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc Renaissance Hotels-Hotel  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=701, Hotels + Motels
Sunstone Hotel Investors Inc Renaissance Washington DC  SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing  SIC3=701, Hotels + Motels
Titan Tire Corp Goodyear Tire & Rubber-North  SIC3=331, Steel Works, Blast Furnaces + Mills  SIC3=301, Tires + Inner TubesTable II: Common words for merging rms from Table I with high similarity
This table presents the common words for the rst 10 mergers from Table I. Firms have both (1)
in dierent two-digit SIC codes and (2) have a merger pair similarity in the highest percentile in
2005 (the most recent year in our sample). The word lists for the remaining mergers from Table I
are presented in Appendix II as Table XIII.
Acquirer (Industry) + Target (Industry): list of common words
Allis-Chalmers Energy Inc (SIC3=735, Equipment Rental & Leasing)  + RPC Inc-Technical Services Bus 
(SIC3=138, Drilling Oil & Gas Wells): accessing, bore, casing, coiled, depths, diameter, downhole, drill, drilled, 
economical, fluids, forklifts, geological, gulf, halliburton, hammer, hevi, hydraulic, hydrocarbons, inject, injected, 
laydown, motors, mountains, nitrogen, oilfield, onshore, permeability, pipe, pipelines, pumps, reservoirs, retrieve, 
Americredit Financial Services (SIC3=619, Finance Services)  + Bay View Acceptance Corp (SIC3=602, National 
Commercial Banks): advise, aforementioned, applicants, captive, dealership, dealerships, defenses, 
delinquencies, depress, depressed, discriminating, discriminatory, earns, franchised, obligors, recession, 
Atlas Pipeline Partners LP (SIC3=492, Natural Gas Transmission)  + Energy Transfer Partners-Elk (SIC3=131, 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas): abandonment, analogous, atlas, basin, basins, bbls, cercla, compressing, 
condensate, cubic, diameter, discrimination, discriminatory, ebitda, ferc, fractionation, gallon, gather, gathered, 
gatherer, geothermal, grange, grievances, hazard, hydrocarbon, hydrocarbons, intrastate, liquids, midstream, 
Belo Corp (SIC3=271, Newspapers: Publishing or Publishing & Printing)  + WUPL-TV, New Orleans, LA 
(SIC3=483, Radio Broadcasting Stations): advertiser, advertisers, affiliation, affirmed, assignments, attribution, 
audience, audiences, austin, broadcaster, broadcasters, broadcasting, broadcasts, carriage, charlotte, 
compulsory, contests, digitally, distant, dmas, duopolies, duopoly, empowers, fare, finds, flag, frequencies, 
george, hispanic, households, indecency, indecent, informational, inquiry, insulated, king, louis, magazines, 
morning, multichannel, necessity, netratings, newspaper, newspapers, nielsen, norfolk, orleans, paramount, 
passive, phoenix, piracy, portland, primetime, providence, purport, random, rank, ranked, reauthorization, 
Buckeye GP LLC (SIC3=461, Pipe Lines)  + Atlas Oil Co-Refined Petroleum (SIC3=590, Retail-Miscellaneous 
Retail): allentown, barge, cercla, citgo, crude, diesel, fuels, gasoline, harrisburg, haven, legality, newark, 
philadelphia, propane, refineries, refiners, spite, superfund, trigger, unitholder, unitholders
CareerStaff Unlimited Inc (SIC3=805, Services-Nursing & Personal Care Facilities)  + ProCare One Nurses LLC 
(SIC3=874, Services-Management Services): accrue, acted, acuity, admissions, adult, arranging, arthritis, 
basket, beds, beneficiaries, careerstaff, contest, disabled, disabling, divested, elderly, encouraged, ethical, 
exclusion, false, hipaa, hospice, incrementally, induce, inpatient, inspector, intermediaries, kickback, knowing, 
knowingly, licensure, liquidated, manuals, mental, nurse, nurses, nursing, offenses, outpatient, payor, pediatric, 
punitive, refinement, rehabilitation, rehabilitative, reimbursable, reimbursements, reimburses, remuneration, 
ChevronTexaco Corp (SIC3=291, Petroleum Refining)  + Unocal Corp (SIC3=131, Crude Petroleum & Natural 
Gas): accidental, acreage, alaska, appraisal, argentina, averaged, barrels, basin, basins, bids, border, canyon, 
caspian, coal, commerciality, concession, concessions, condensate, congo, consortium, consumed, crude, 
cubic, deepwater, delineation, democratic, discoveries, drill, drilled, exploitation, exploratory, exported, extracted, 
exxonmobil, farm, fired, formulas, fuels, gasoline, gasolines, geothermal, gulf, hydrocarbon, hydrocarbons, 
indonesia, java, liquids, malo, megawatts, memorandum, onshore, petrochemical, philippine, philippines, 
pipelines, ports, producible, progressed, prospect, proved, ramp, refined, refinery, refining, reservoir, reservoirs, 
Correctional Properties Trust (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Geo Group Inc-Lawton (SIC3=874, 
Services-Management Services): adelanto, adult, alcohol, appropriation, appropriations, architects, aurora, 
awarding, beds, broward, cornell, correctional, corrections, counseling, customs, deems, desert, detainees, 
detention, falck, george, golden, hobbs, immigration, inmate, inmates, jena, juvenile, karnes, lawton, male, 
Eagle Hosp Prop Trust Inc (SIC3=679, Miscellaneous Investing)  + Hilton Glendale, Glandale, CA (SIC3=701, 
Hotels & Motels): accumulates, airport, booked, bookings, concessions, contrary, embassy, franchisees, 
franchisor, guest, guests, hilton, hospitality, hotel, illiquidity, indoor, instructions, insuring, intermediaries, lodging, 
EMCORE Corp (SIC3=355, Special Industry Machinery)  + JDS Uniphase Corp-Analog CATV (SIC3=366, 
Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus): achieves, addressable, agilent, alcatel, amplification, amplifiers, amplitude, 
attest, band, brightness, broadest, cables, catv, cavity, centralizing, choosing, cisco, closer, complimentary, 
consumed, contributors, converging, datacom, defect, defective, deferring, dense, deposition, destinations, 
detectible, deteriorate, diode, diodes, disadvantages, discouraging, disproportionate, disruptive, diverting, Table III: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported for our sample based on 1997 to 2005. Product similarities are measures that lie in
the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see
Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to
those of other rms. We compute product similarities based on the ten nearest rms and based on all rms
excluding the 10 nearest. The fraction of nearest neighbors who were involved in restructuring transactions in the
past year is computed both based on the rm's ten nearest neighbors and based on three-digit SIC codes. The %
neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the
10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent. Announcement returns are net of the
CRSP value weighted index and are measured relative to the three-day window bracketing the announcement date.
The gain in product dierentiation is the product distance from the target to the acquirer's ten nearest neighbors,
less the acquirer's distance to its ten nearest neighbors. We compute three measures of ex-post acquirer real
performance. All are based on the rst set of accounting numbers available after the transaction is eective (call this
the \eective year"), and we consider one to three year changes in performance thereafter (this method avoids bias
from trying to measure pre-merger performance of two separate rms). We compute protability as operating
income divided by assets or sales in each year, and we then truncate the distribution at (-1,1) to control for outliers
(winsorizing produces similar results). We then compute the change in this variable from the eective year to one to
three years thereafter. We compute log sales growth as the natural log of ex-post sales divided by the level of sales
in the eective year.
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Minimum Median Maximum Obs.
Panel A: Firm Variables
Target Dummy 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Acquirer Dummy 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Target of Merger Dummy 0.043 0.202 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Acquirer in Merger Dummy 0.104 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Target of Acq. of Assets Dummy 0.108 0.311 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Acquirer of Acq. of Assets Dummy 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 1.000 47,394
Product Similarity (Overall-10) 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.017 0.055 47,394
Product Similarity (10 nearest) 0.159 0.069 0.028 0.143 0.639 47,394
Fraction 10 Nearest Restructuring 0.377 0.115 0.020 0.380 0.810 47,394
Fraction SIC-3 Restructuring 0.371 0.138 0.000 0.366 1.000 47,394
Log Assets 5.374 2.132 0.000 5.304 13.962 47,394
SIC-3 Industry Sales-based HHI 0.048 0.026 0.000 0.044 0.229 47,394
% Neighbor Patent Words 0.147 0.182 0.000 0.083 0.900 47,394
Panel B: Transaction Level Variables
Target Ann. Return (-1,+1) 0.095 0.220 -0.878 0.023 4.941 4,932
Acquirer Ann. Return (-1,+1) 0.004 0.079 -0.602 0.000 1.906 5,274
Gain in Product Dierentiation 0.088 0.076 -0.355 0.077 0.944 5,274
Merger Pair Similarity 0.093 0.066 0.007 0.080 0.246 5,274
Panel C: Acquirer Ex-Post Real Performance
1-Year  Protability (scaled by assets) -0.005 0.088 -0.940 0.000 0.985 4,451
3-Year  Protability (scaled by assets) -0.016 0.113 -1.117 -0.004 0.985 4,451
1-Year  Protability (scaled by sales) -0.005 0.126 -1.136 -0.003 1.321 4,451
3-Year  Protability (scaled by sales) -0.020 0.167 -1.131 -0.013 1.486 4,451
1-Year Log Sales Growth 0.159 0.334 -4.039 0.125 3.559 4,451
3-Year Log Sales Growth 0.270 0.558 -6.090 0.233 7.179 4,451
1-Year  COGS (scaled by sales) 0.005 0.088 -0.791 0.003 0.930 4,451
3-Year  COGS (scaled by sales) 0.011 0.122 -0.923 0.009 0.962 4,451
1-Year  SG+A (scaled by sales) -0.000 0.079 -0.974 0.000 0.935 4,451
3-Year  SG+A (scaled by sales) 0.008 0.120 -0.957 0.002 1.029 4,451
1-Year  CAPX (scaled by assets) -0.000 0.037 -0.381 0.000 0.291 4,451
3-Year  CAPX (scaled by assets) -0.001 0.045 -0.435 0.000 0.304 4,451Table IV: Pearson Correlation Coecients
Pearson Correlation Coecients are reported for our sample based on 1997 to 2005. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two
rms use the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to those
of other rms. We compute product similarities based on the ten and one hundred nearest rms and based on all rms excluding the 10 nearest. We also include the fraction of nearest
neighbors who were involved in restructuring transactions in the past year, as well as a similar fraction based on three-digit SIC code groupings. The % neighbor patent words variable
is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent.
Product Product Product Last Year Last Year
Similarity Similarity Similarity 10 Nearest SIC-3 Industry
Row Variable (All Firms-10) (100 Nearest) (10 Nearest) % Restructured % Restructured HHI
Panel A: Correlation Coecients
(1) Product Similarity (100 Nearest) 0.601
(2) Product Similarity (10 Nearest) 0.520 0.914
(3) % Restructured Last Year (100 Nearest) -0.060 -0.275 -0.204
(4) % Restructured Last Year (SIC-3) -0.007 -0.095 -0.067 0.547
(5) Industry Sales based Herndahl Index (SIC-3) -0.097 -0.115 -0.080 0.070 0.084
(6) % Neighbor Patent Words 0.015 -0.011 -0.120 -0.431 -0.277 -0.048Table V: Eect of product similarity on protability
OLS regressions with protability dened as operating income divided by sales (Panel A) or Assets (Panel B) as the dependent variable. All specications include yearly xed eects
and standard errors account for clustering across year and SIC-3 industries. The sample is from 1997 to 2005, and product similarity is based on the word content of the product
description section of the 10-K ling. A higher similarity measure implies the rm has a product description more closely linked to those of other rms. We compute product
similarities based on the 10 most similar rms. We report Sales HHI (SIC-3) based on the two step tted method described in Hoberg and Phillips (2008) (accounts for public and
private rms). Log assets is the natural log of COMPUSTAT assets. The log book to market ratio is as dened in Davis, Fama, and French (2000) and we use a dummy to indicate
when the raw book to market ratio is negative. We dene Big (Small) rms as those with above (below) median ex-ante book assets.
Product SIC-3 Sales Log Negative Year+
Depdendent Similarity HHI Log Book/ B/M SIC-3 Adj
Row Variable Sample (10 Nearest) (tted) Assets Market Dummy Fixed Eects R2 Obs
Panel A: Protability scaled by sales
(1) oi/sales All Firms -0.379 -0.297 0.057 0.015 -0.114 Yes 0.374 46,312
(-2.85) (-0.80) (19.82) (2.66) (-8.52)
(2) oi/sales Big Firms -0.156 -0.343 0.021 -0.027 -0.008 Yes 0.355 23,160
(-2.66) (-1.14) (9.09) (-5.37) (-0.71)
(3) oi/sales Small Firms -0.990 0.099 0.090 0.025 -0.118 Yes 0.314 23,152
(-4.67) (0.16) (21.70) (3.49) (-7.14)
Panel B: Protability scaled by assets
(4) oi/assets All Firms -0.244 0.004 0.037 -0.001 -0.099 Yes 0.252 46,312
(-3.28) (0.02) (14.21) (-0.11) (-8.92)
(5) oi/assets Big Firms -0.099 0.130 0.003 -0.034 0.041 Yes 0.318 23,160
(-3.48) (0.85) (2.82) (-11.38) (5.37)
(6) oi/assets Small Firms -0.700 0.182 0.081 0.009 -0.115 Yes 0.270 23,152
(-5.82) (0.43) (20.89) (1.52) (-8.28)
4
4Table VI: Mergers and Acquisitions and Product Similarity
The table displays marginal eects of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the given rm is an acquirer of a merger or an acquisition of
assets (Panel A) or a target (Panel B). Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K product
descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to those of other rms. The independent variables
include the fraction of nearest neighbors who were involved in restructuring transactions in the past year, as well as the average product similarity of each rm relative to its ten
nearest neighbors, and relative to all rms excluding its ten nearest neighbors. We also include the fraction of past-year restructurings based on three-digit SIC code groupings. The %
neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word
patent. The sample is from 1997 to 2005. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the year and industry level. Marginal eects are displayed as percentages.
Product Product Last Year Last Year Last Year Last Year
Dependent Similarity Similarity Industry 10 Nearest SIC-3 % Neighbor Log Total
Row Variable (All Firms-10) (10 Nearest) HHI (SIC-3) % Restructured % Restructured Patent Words Assets Obs
Panel A: Acquirer Likelihood
(1) Acquirer? 2.073 -3.100 6.258 1.747 10.250 47,394
(7.64) (-7.65) (20.25) (4.61) (34.92)
(2) Acquirer? 0.671 7.133 2.409 9.749 47,394
(3.10) (22.28) (5.96) (32.18)
(3) Acquirer? -1.863 6.499 1.971 10.239 47,394
(-6.00) (20.86) (5.14) (35.23)
(4) Acquirer? -1.297 5.287 1.034 10.368 47,394
(-2.76) (16.32) (2.16) (35.68)
(5) Acquirer? 1.942 -3.308 -1.662 4.849 2.891 1.878 10.262 47,394
(7.66) (-8.14) (-4.10) (14.59) (10.25) (4.88) (34.96)
Panel B: Target Likelihood
(6) Target? 0.626 -1.281 3.559 1.738 8.289 47,394
(3.20) (-4.29) (14.82) (6.50) (44.36)
(7) Target? 0.061 3.891 2.013 8.116 47,394
(0.35) (16.87) (7.39) (43.98)
(8) Target? -0.894 3.632 1.796 8.284 47,394
(-3.45) (15.02) (6.57) (44.41)
(9) Target? 0.566 2.378 1.268 8.465 47,394
(2.38) (12.36) (4.79) (44.43)
(10) Target? 0.657 -1.225 0.420 3.013 1.045 1.878 8.196 47,394
(3.35) (-4.05) (1.92) (11.75) (5.22) (6.83) (43.80)Table VII: M+A and Product Similarity by Transaction Type
The table examines the likelihood of mergers and acquisition of assets. We display marginal eects from logistic regressions. In Panel A, the dependent variable equal to one if the
given rm was a target or acquirer in a merger as identied in column two. In Panel B, we focus on acquisition of assets transactions. Product similarities are measures that lie in the
interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a
product description more closely related to those of other rms. The independent variables include the fraction of nearest neighbors who were involved in restructuring transactions in
the past year, as well as the average product similarity of each rm relative to its ten nearest neighbors, and relative to all rms excluding its ten nearest neighbors. We also include
the fraction of past-year restructurings based on three-digit SIC code groupings. The % neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the
percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent. The sample is from 1997 to 2005. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the year
and industry level. Marginal eects are displayed as percentages.
Product Product Last Year Last Year Last Year Last Year
Depdendent Similarity Similarity Industry 10 Nearest SIC-3 % Neighbor Log Total
Row Variable (All Firms-10) (10 Nearest) HHI (SIC-3) % Restructured % Restructured Patent Words Assets Obs
Panel A: Mergers Only
(1) Acquirer of a Merger 0.994 -0.586 1.594 0.975 4.793 47,394
(4.11) (-1.99) (6.56) (3.77) (19.77)
(2) Acquirer of a Merger -2.088 1.546 0.724 5.005 47,394
(-5.39) (7.39) (3.17) (21.53)
(3) Acquirer of a Merger 0.859 -0.868 -2.144 1.176 0.946 0.915 4.910 47,394
(3.88) (-3.02) (-5.45) (5.03) (4.78) (3.75) (21.96)
(4) Target of a Merger 0.276 0.318 0.603 -0.395 1.151 47,394
(2.64) (2.43) (4.76) (-2.78) (10.40)
(5) Target of a Merger -0.246 0.334 -0.613 1.301 47,394
(-1.94) (3.07) (-4.27) (11.86)
(6) Target of a Merger 0.267 0.293 -0.150 0.529 0.146 -0.399 1.154 47,394
(2.53) (2.24) (-1.19) (3.87) (1.27) (-2.75) (10.36)
Panel B: Acquisition of Assets Only
(7) Acquirer of an Acq of 1.020 -2.660 4.644 0.573 5.251 47,394
Assets (4.59) (-8.28) (16.52) (1.70) (21.36)
(8) Acquirer of an Acq of 0.469 3.592 0.195 5.185 47,394
Assets (1.46) (14.61) (0.48) (22.54)
(9) Acquirer of an Acq of 1.026 -2.611 0.176 3.706 1.873 0.810 5.142 47,394
Assets (4.58) (-8.09) (0.63) (12.40) (8.05) (2.35) (20.47)
(10) Target of an Acq of 0.419 -1.891 2.980 2.055 7.009 47,394
Assets (2.42) (-7.44) (13.85) (8.83) (45.22)
(11) Target of an Acq of 0.731 1.986 1.739 7.060 47,394
Assets (3.86) (11.46) (7.21) (44.74)
(12) Target of an Acq of 0.456 -1.816 0.498 2.519 0.877 2.203 6.918 47,394
Assets (2.64) (-7.11) (2.92) (11.49) (5.23) (9.39) (44.80)Table VIII: Economic Magnitudes of Predicting Transaction Incidence
The table displays economic magnitudes associated with various ndings reported earlier in this study. All magnitudes are predicted values, and all magnitudes are conditional and thus
account for the eects of industry, year and all control variables (based models in earlier tables as noted in panel headers). For each dependent variable being considered (noted in the
description column), we rst set all control variables to their mean values and compute the model's predicted value. The result of this calculation is the value displayed in the \mean"
column in each category. For each independent variable whose economic magnitude we are measuring (product similarity 10 nearest, product similarity overall, and neighbor patent
worlds), which is noted in the column headers, we also compute the model's predicted value assuming the given independent variable is expected to be in the 10th and 90th percentile
of its distribution, while still holding all control variables xed at their mean. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use
the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see Appendix 1). We consider similarity based on a rm's ten closest rivals, and similarity based on all rms in the universe
excluding these ten rms. A higher similarity implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to those of other rms. The % neighbor patent words variable is the
average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent. The sample is from 1997 to 2005.
Product Similarity (10 Nearest) Product Similarity (All-10) Neighbor Patent Words
Row Description 10 %ile Mean 90 %ile 10 %ile Mean 90 %ile 10 %ile Mean 90 %ile
Panel A: Target and Acquirer Logit Models (Based on models in Table VI)
1 All Firms: Target Incidence 16.6% 15.1% 13.5% 14.3% 15.1% 15.9% 12.7% 15.1% 17.5%
2 All Firms: Acquirer Incidence 19.4% 15.1% 10.8% 12.5% 15.1% 17.7% 12.7% 15.1% 17.5%
Panel B: Large Firms
3 Big Firms: Target Incidence 23.1% 21.3% 19.5% 19.7% 21.3% 22.8% 16.4% 21.3% 26.2%
4 Big Firms: Acquirer Incidence 41.8% 37.1% 32.4% 34.5% 37.1% 39.7% 31.5% 37.1% 42.7%
Panel C: Small Firms
5 Small Firms: Target Incidence 9.3% 8.9% 8.5% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.7% 8.9% 9.0%
6 Small Firms: Acquirer Incidence 22.6% 19.2% 15.8% 16.1% 19.2% 22.2% 18.8% 19.2% 19.6%
Panel D: Mergers Only (Based on models in Table VII)
7 Mergers Only: Target Incidence 3.9% 4.3% 4.7% 3.9% 4.3% 4.6% 4.8% 4.3% 3.7%
8 Mergers Only: Acquirer Incidence 11.6% 10.4% 9.3% 9.3% 10.4% 11.6% 9.2% 10.4% 11.6%
Panel E: Acquisition of Assets Only (Based on models in Table VII)
9 Acq Assets Only: Target Incidence 13.1% 10.8% 8.5% 10.3% 10.8% 11.4% 8.0% 10.8% 13.7%
10 Acq Assets Only: Acquirer Incidence 21.1% 17.7% 14.3% 16.3% 17.7% 19.1% 16.7% 17.7% 18.8%Table IX: Announcement Returns
The table displays panel data regressions in which the dependent variable is the abnormal announcement return of combined target and acquirer. Announcement returns are computed
over various windows including day t=-10 to day t=0 (t=0 is the announcement date) as indicated in the event window column. The combined rm's raw return is the total market
capitalization of both rms at the end of the event window minus the original market capitalization, divided by the original market capitalization. The abnormal return results after
subtracting the return of the CRSP value weighted market index over each event window. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which
two rms use the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to
those of other rms. We compute product similarities based on the ten nearest rms (for both the acquirer and the target). We also compute the pairwise similarity of the target and
the acquirer. The % neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word
root as the word patent. The same SIC-3 industry dummy is one if the target and acquirer reside in the same three-digit SIC code. The vertical similarity dummy is one if the target
and acquirer are more than 5% vertically related (based on Fan and Goyal (2006)). Target relative size is the ex-ante market value of the target divided by that of the acquirer. The
merger dummy is one if the transaction is a merger and zero if it is an acquisition of assets. Log total size is the natural logarithm of the summed ex-ante market values of the two
rms. Large targets are dened as those at least 10% of the size of the acquirer. The sample is from 1997 to 2005. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the year and industry level.
Acquirer Target Gain in Target + % Nei- Same Vert Acquirer
Product Product Prod. Acquirer ghbor SIC-3 ical Industry Target Full Merger x Log
Event Simil. Simil. Di. vs. Pair Patent Industry Simil. HHI Relative Merger Relative Total
Window to Rivals to Rivals Rivals Simil. Words Dummy Dummy (SIC-3) Size Dummy Size $ Size R2 Obs
Combined Firm Announcement Returns
(1) t=0 only 0.017 -0.015 0.006 -0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.000 -0.003 0.021 -0.002 0.022 4,937
(2.32) (-2.21) (1.35) (-0.20) (-1.16) (1.26) (0.09) (-1.44) (3.16) (-6.56)
(2) t=0 only 0.017 0.007 0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.010 0.000 -0.003 0.021 -0.002 0.022 4,937
(2.41) (0.58) (1.56) (-0.09) (-1.16) (1.02) (0.05) (-1.47) (3.18) (-6.53)
(3) t=-1 to 0 0.015 -0.018 0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.023 -0.003 0.023 4,937
(1.66) (-2.15) (1.15) (1.11) (-0.94) (1.02) (0.49) (-1.02) (3.06) (-6.62)
(4) t=-1 to 0 0.020 0.002 0.007 0.002 -0.004 0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.023 -0.003 0.023 4,937
(2.52) (0.14) (1.39) (1.22) (-0.95) (0.75) (0.42) (-0.98) (3.08) (-6.75)
(5) t=-5 to 0 0.032 -0.042 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.022 -0.004 0.024 4,937
(2.31) (-3.51) (0.82) (0.78) (0.06) (0.25) (0.89) (1.16) (2.35) (-6.76)
(6) t=-5 to 0 0.026 0.024 0.008 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.022 -0.004 0.023 4,937
(2.02) (1.32) (1.28) (0.71) (-0.01) (-0.19) (0.80) (0.96) (2.36) (-6.55)
(7) t=-10 to 0 0.041 -0.037 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.028 -0.004 0.018 4,937
(2.42) (-2.67) (0.50) (1.23) (0.21) (-0.12) (-0.15) (1.89) (2.79) (-5.01)
(8) t=-10 to 0 0.033 0.047 0.006 0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.028 -0.003 0.018 4,937
(2.01) (2.23) (0.89) (1.06) (0.15) (-0.41) (-0.20) (1.65) (2.79) (-4.71)Table X: Long Term Performance of Acquirers
The table displays panel data regressions in which three year ex-post (after the eective date) changes in industry-adjusted performance measures are the dependent variable. For a
transaction that becomes eective in year t, ex-post cashow change or sales growth is the one to three year change in protability from year t+1 until year t+2 (one year) or t+4
(three year) as noted in the horizon column. The measure of performance in Panel A is operating income divided by assets, in Panel B, it is operating income divided by sales, and in
Panel C, it is log sales growth. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K product
descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to those of other rms. The acquirer product similarity
(10 nearest) is the average similarity between the acquirer and its ten closest rivals. The target and acquirer product similarity is the pairwise similarity between the acquirer and
target rms' products. The gain in product dierentiation is the product distance from the target to the acquirer's ten nearest neighbors, less the acquirer's distance to its ten nearest
neighbors. The % neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word
root as the word patent. The same SIC-3 industry dummy is one if the target and acquirer reside in the same three-digit SIC code. The vertical similarity dummy is one if the target
and acquirer are more than 5% vertically related (based on Fan and Goyal (2006)). Target relative size is the ex-ante market value of the target divided by that of the acquirer. The
merger dummy is one if the transaction is a merger and zero if it is an acquisition of assets. Log total size is the natural logarithm of the summed ex-ante market values of the two
rms. The sample is from 1997 to 2005. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the year and industry level.
Acquirer Gain Target + % Nei- Same Vert Acquirer
Product in Prod. Acquirer ghbor SIC-3 ical Industry Target Merger x Log
Simil. Di. vs. Pair Patent Industry Simil. HHI Relative Merger Relative Total
Row Horizon (10 Near.) Rivals Simil. Words Dummy Dummy (SIC-3) Size Dummy Size $ Size R2 Obs
Panel A: Operating Income/Assets
(1) 1 Year 0.035 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.033 0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.004 4,451
(1.39) (0.49) (-1.01) (-0.75) (1.11) (1.18) (0.49) (-0.27) (0.35)
(2) 3 Year 0.071 0.001 -0.008 -0.031 0.080 0.017 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.017 4,451
(2.47) (0.04) (-1.96) (-2.86) (1.88) (2.86) (0.00) (0.31) (-1.39)
(3) 1 Year 0.034 0.054 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 0.034 0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.006 4,451
(1.88) (2.28) (0.56) (-1.12) (-0.74) (1.17) (1.15) (0.26) (-0.30) (0.72)
(4) 3 Year 0.052 0.085 0.001 -0.009 -0.031 0.083 0.017 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.018 4,451
(2.27) (2.74) (0.05) (-2.05) (-2.81) (1.97) (2.87) (-0.24) (0.26) (-1.00)
Panel B: Operating Income/sales
(5) 1 Year 0.020 0.025 -0.005 -0.002 0.056 0.013 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 4,451
(0.42) (1.75) (-1.13) (-0.21) (1.60) (1.86) (-0.24) (-0.35) (-2.42)
(6) 3 Year 0.049 0.023 -0.010 -0.044 0.077 0.026 -0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.017 4,451
(0.96) (0.89) (-1.78) (-2.97) (1.44) (2.70) (-0.30) (0.34) (-3.19)
(7) 1 Year 0.020 -0.002 0.024 -0.005 -0.002 0.058 0.013 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 4,451
(0.58) (-0.05) (1.68) (-0.99) (-0.18) (1.73) (1.88) (-0.15) (-0.36) (-2.49)
(8) 3 Year 0.015 0.032 0.021 -0.010 -0.044 0.082 0.026 -0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.017 4,451
(0.38) (0.64) (0.84) (-1.69) (-2.95) (1.53) (2.73) (-0.35) (0.33) (-3.18)
Panel C: Log Sales Growth
(9) 1 Year 0.410 0.002 0.009 -0.001 -0.180 0.069 0.014 0.049 -0.015 0.030 4,451
(5.83) (0.05) (0.80) (-0.04) (-2.05) (3.79) (0.99) (1.20) (-4.27)
(10) 3 Year 0.714 -0.016 0.011 -0.008 -0.022 0.071 -0.006 -0.019 -0.014 0.018 4,451
(5.31) (-0.16) (0.59) (-0.16) (-0.16) (2.36) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-2.63)
(11) 1 Year 0.275 0.296 -0.005 0.009 0.003 -0.153 0.070 0.012 0.046 -0.014 0.027 4,451
(4.37) (3.78) (-0.11) (0.83) (0.10) (-1.78) (3.86) (0.90) (1.13) (-3.82)
(12) 3 Year 0.472 0.488 -0.029 0.012 -0.001 0.026 0.074 -0.008 -0.025 -0.012 0.015 4,451
(4.05) (3.56) (-0.30) (0.64) (-0.02) (0.19) (2.45) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-2.22)Table XI: Ex-post Product Descriptions of Acquirers
The table displays panel data regressions in which three year ex-post (from year t+1 to t+4) logarithmic growth in the size of the rm's product description is the dependent variable.
Size of the product description is measured as the number of words. Firms with larger increases in the size of their product description are interpreted as having introduced more
products relative to other rms. For a transaction that becomes eective in year t, ex-post product line growth is the one to three year growth in the size of the product description
size from year t+1 until year t+2 (one year), t+3, and t+4 (three year) as noted in the horizon column. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the
degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K product descriptions (see Appendix 1). A higher similarity measure implies that the rm has a product description more
closely related to those of other rms. The acquirer product similarity (10 nearest) is the average similarity between the acquirer and its ten closest rivals. The target and acquirer
product similarity is the pairwise similarity between the acquirer and target rms' products. The gain in product dierentiation is the product distance from the target to the
acquirer's ten nearest neighbors, less the acquirer's distance to its ten nearest neighbors. The % neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest neighbors of the
percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent. The same SIC-3 industry dummy is one if the target and acquirer reside in the
same three-digit SIC code. The vertical similarity dummy is one if the target and acquirer are more than 5% vertically related (based on Fan and Goyal (2006)). Target relative size is
the ex-ante market value of the target divided by that of the acquirer. The merger dummy is one if the transaction is a merger and zero if it is an acquisition of assets. Log total size is
the natural logarithm of the summed ex-ante market values of the two rms. The initial product description size is the natural logarithm of the total number of words in the rm's
initial (year t+1) product description. The sample is from 1997 to 2005. t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at the year and industry level.
Acquirer Gain Target + % Nei- Same Vert Acquirer Initial
Product in Prod. Acquirer ghbor SIC-3 ical Industry Target Merger x Log Prod.
Simil. Di. vs. Pair Patent Industry Simil. HHI Relative Merger Relative Total Desc.
Row Horizon (10 Near.) Rivals Simil. Words Dummy Dummy (SIC-3) Size Dummy Size $ Size Size R2 Obs
Panel A: Ex post growth in product description
(1) 1 Year 0.610 0.074 -0.024 0.122 0.021 -0.051 -0.011 0.108 0.015 -0.275 0.118 3,898
(3.56) (1.19) (-1.24) (2.69) (0.15) (-1.43) (-0.34) (1.69) (2.86) (-11.72)
(2) 2 Year 0.727 0.074 -0.021 0.119 0.056 -0.037 -0.013 0.094 0.018 -0.361 0.155 3,898
(4.22) (1.13) (-0.88) (2.17) (0.30) (-0.94) (-0.38) (1.16) (2.98) (-15.83)
(3) 3 Year 0.716 0.209 -0.002 0.162 0.056 -0.027 -0.014 -0.009 0.014 -0.396 0.177 3,898
(3.58) (2.97) (-0.10) (2.85) (0.27) (-0.67) (-0.40) (-0.10) (2.59) (-17.01)
(4) 1 Year 0.213 0.891 0.068 -0.034 0.125 0.076 -0.047 -0.026 0.100 0.019 -0.273 0.120 3,898
(1.35) (4.68) (1.10) (-1.77) (2.72) (0.55) (-1.32) (-0.83) (1.59) (3.47) (-11.83)
(5) 2 Year 0.263 0.943 0.064 -0.031 0.123 0.124 -0.031 -0.029 0.085 0.022 -0.357 0.156 3,898
(1.66) (4.54) (0.98) (-1.31) (2.28) (0.69) (-0.80) (-0.80) (1.05) (3.49) (-15.84)
(6) 3 Year 0.181 0.812 0.195 -0.011 0.166 0.133 -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 0.018 -0.389 0.176 3,898
(1.06) (3.69) (2.77) (-0.45) (2.91) (0.67) (-0.50) (-0.74) (-0.20) (3.10) (-16.90)Table XII: Economic Magnitudes of Returns and Real Outcomes
The table displays economic magnitudes associated with various ndings reported earlier in this study. All magnitudes are predicted values, and all magnitudes are conditional and
thus account for the eects of industry, year and all control variables. For each dependent variable being considered (noted in the panel headers and the description column), we rst
set all control variables to their mean values and compute the model's predicted value. The result of this calculation is the value displayed in the \mean" column in each category. For
each independent variable whose economic magnitude we are measuring (product similarity 10 nearest, product similarity overall, and neighbor patent worlds), which is noted in the
column headers, we also compute the model's predicted value assuming the given independent variable is expected to be in the 10th and 90th percentile of its distribution, while still
holding all control variables xed at their mean. Product similarities are measures that lie in the interval (0,1) based on the degree to which two rms use the same words in their 10-K
product descriptions (see Appendix 1). We consider similarity based on a rm's ten closest rivals, and similarity based on all rms in the universe excluding these ten rms. A higher
similarity implies that the rm has a product description more closely related to those of other rms. The % neighbor patent words variable is the average over a rm's ten nearest
neighbors of the percentage of words in the 10-K product description having the same word root as the word patent. The sample is from 1997 to 2005.
Product Similarity (10 Nearest) Neighbor Patent Words
Row Description 10 %ile Mean 90 %ile 10 %ile Mean 90 %ile
Panel A: Announcement Returns (Based on models in Table IX)
1 Combined Firm Ann Returns (t=0) 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6%
2 Combined Firm Ann Returns (t=-10 to t=0) 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7%
Panel B: Protability and Sales Growth (Based on models in Table X)
3  OI/Assets: 1 Year (A) -0.9% -0.5% -0.2% -0.7% -0.5% -0.4%
4  OI/Assets: 3 Year (A) -2.3% -1.6% -0.9% -1.6% -1.6% -1.6%
5  OI/Sales: 1 Year (A) -0.6% -0.5% -0.3% -1.0% -0.5% 0.1%
8  OI/Sales: 3 Year (A) -2.4% -2.0% -1.5% -2.4% -2.0% -1.5%
7 Sales Growth: 1 Year (A) 11.9% 15.9% 19.9% 15.8% 15.9% 15.9%
8 Sales Growth: 3 Year (A) 20.0% 27.0% 33.9% 27.3% 27.0% 26.6%
Panel C: Growth in Product Descriptions (Based on models in Table XI)
9 Prod Desc Growth: 1 Year (A) -2.4% 3.3% 9.1% 1.7% 3.3% 5.0%
10 Prod Desc Growth: 3 Year (A) -3.4% 3.3% 10.1% -1.3% 3.3% 7.9%Figure 1:
The large dashed circles give a visual depiction of Symantec's and Veritas's ten closest rival rms determined using our measure of product similarity
described in Section II. Symantec and Veritas are both within each other's circle of ten nearest rivals. Each rm has a header beginning with the letter \S"
or \V" followed by a number. This identies which rm's circle of ten nearest rivals the given rm exists in, and also how close the given rm is to either
Symantec or Veritas. For example, McAfee has a code \S7" and is thus Symantec's seventh closest rival. Veritas is Symantec's 18th closest rival, and thus is
an example of a rm that is similar to Symantec, but a rm that also might oer Symantec added product dierentiation relative to its very closest rivals.
For each rm, we also report its primary three-digit SIC code in parentheses.
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The large dashed circles give a visual depiction of Disney's and Pixar's ten closest rival rms determined using our measure of product similarity described
in Section II. Disney and Pixar are both within each other's circle of ten nearest rivals. The one rm in the middle (News Corp) is common to both Disney
and Pixar's circle of ten nearest rivals. Each rm has a header beginning with the letter \D" or \P" followed by a number. This identies which rm's circle
of ten nearest rivals the given rm exists in, and also how close the given rm is to either Disney or Pixar. For example, Six Flags has a code \D4" and is
thus Disney's fourth closest rival. Pixar is Disney's ninth closest rival, and thus is an example of a rm that is similar to Disney, but a rm that also might
oer Disney added product dierentiation relative to its very closest rivals. For each rm, we also report its primary three-digit SIC code in parentheses.
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Distribution of product similarity for random rm pairings and merger pairings. Each plot is an
empirical density function, and total probability mass sums to one. The lower axis reects
similarities between zero and 100 (similarities are displayed as percentages for convenience). We
truncate displayed results at 50%. The small number of outliers with values higher than 50% are
represented by the probability mass assigned to the last bin. The random rm pairings group is
based on the subsample of rms that merged, but the dierences are taken with respect to a
randomly chosen pair of rms in this subsample (results nearly identical in set of rms that did not
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